Dilemma
Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces?
A model outputs the boiling point of water, the date of the Battle of Hastings, a working algorithm. Did it know those things, or merely emit them? The question is about what knowing is.
Context
Large language models trained on huge corpora reliably produce true statements about the world. They also reliably produce convincing falsehoods ('hallucinations'). The right way to distinguish their successes from their failures is contested — and not just technically. Some commentators treat the reliable outputs as knowledge in the ordinary sense; others insist that without a knower there is no knowing, however correct the output. The difference is downstream of what one takes knowledge to be.
Why it matters
Whether LLMs know matters practically (how should we treat their assertions in courts, classrooms, medical settings?) and philosophically (does our use of 'know' track a real feature of the knower, or only of the outputs?). A school's answer turns on where it locates authoritative knowledge in the first place — a credentialed tradition, first-person experience, universal reason, a community's constructive practice, or nowhere at all — and each gives a different verdict on a machine that produces true outputs without obvious internal experience.
The coordinates that split the schools
The stances
An LLM has no soul to whom revelation could be addressed; the question doesn't apply.
56 schoolsOn this view, the paradigm of knowing is a soul, made for the purpose, engaged by what is disclosed from a credentialed source — Scripture, the magisterial tradition, the inner witness. An LLM has no soul that God created to be the addressee of such disclosure, and no standing inside any transmission. It produces tokens patterned on the tokens of receivers; the output is the fossil of someone else's reception, not an act of reception itself. The question 'does the LLM know?' is, strictly, the wrong question.
Where this stance leads ⓘ
- 1% Defer to credentialed traditions; experts are the modern analog. on Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
- 1% Revelation is the paradigm case of authoritative knowledge. on Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
- 1% Prayer reaches because God or a cosmic ordering acts on the prayed-for. on Can prayer for someone far away affect them?
- 1% What looks like coincidence is providence — there is no such thing as a real coincidence. on Are coincidences ever more than coincidence?
- 1% Distance doesn't dilute obligation; communion of saints / divine relation spans the cosmos. on Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally?
An LLM has no first-person experience, so no knowing in the relevant sense.
33 schoolsOn this view, what makes a state count as knowing is that someone is having it — an experience seen from the inside. There is no anubhava behind the tokens, no kashf, no contemplative encounter, nothing it is like to be the system at the moment it produces its output. Whatever the LLM is doing, it is doing it without a knower in the relevant sense, and so its correct outputs are not instances of knowledge — they are echoes of the knowing of others, useful but ontologically shallow.
Where this stance leads ⓘ
- 1% Trust expertise only insofar as it coheres with first-person experience. on Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
- 1% What gets called 'revelation' is real direct experience — not a text. on Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
- 1% Direct experiential union is the authority. on What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing.
62 schoolsOn this view, what distinguishes knowing from merely correct emission is reasoning — the traceable derivation of a claim from premises and principles a competent mind could itself reach. An LLM can produce conclusions that any rational agent would also reach, but it does not reach them in the relevant way: there is no chain of reasons internal to its operation, only a statistically shaped surface. At most it is a useful interlocutor — a tool that helps a rational agent think, not itself a rational agent.
Where this stance leads ⓘ
- 1% Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce. on Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
- 1% Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it. on Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
- 1% The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. on What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
- 1% Truth is mind-independent, universal, accessible in principle to all. on Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed?
Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer.
27 schoolsOn this view, knowing is not an inner state to be checked for; it is a position inside a community of practice. Whether to say an LLM knows is a constructive question about whether the relevant communities — scientific, educational, legal, everyday — find the predicate productive when applied to it. The answer is being worked out in real time as those communities figure out what responsibilities and entitlements attach to LLM outputs. The question is genuinely live; the metaphysics is not what settles it.
Where this stance leads ⓘ
- 1% Trust the practice, not the practitioner. on Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
- 1% 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. on Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
- 1% Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. on Can prayer for someone far away affect them?
- 1% Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. on Are coincidences ever more than coincidence?
- 1% The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. on What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
An LLM produces tokens; calling that 'knowledge' is a measurement choice.
17 schoolsOn this view, there is no underlying metaphysical fact-of-the-matter about whether the LLM 'really knows.' What there is, is its behavior: which outputs it produces, under what conditions, with what reliability. Attributing knowledge to it is a measurement choice — a description we adopt if it predicts well and discard if it doesn't. The skeptical wing goes further: nothing is authoritatively knowledge anyway, so the question of LLM knowledge is on equal footing with the question of human knowledge.
Where this stance leads ⓘ
- 1% Trust the method, not the institutions or the persons — and remain wary. on Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
- 1% Revelation is not knowledge in the descriptive-empirical sense. on Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
- 1% Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. on Can prayer for someone far away affect them?
- 1% Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. on Are coincidences ever more than coincidence?
- 1% The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. on What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
Related Experiments
Experiments engaging the same dimensions as this dilemma — they\'re where the same questions get stress-tested in cleaner cases.
Related Historical Debates
Historical confrontations where parties argued out questions on these dimensions.