School #13

Relationalism

Leibniz, Mach

Relationalism holds that space and time have no independent existence — they are nothing but the totality of spatial and temporal relations among objects and events. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz articulated the classic statement in his 'Correspondence with Samuel Clarke' (1715-16), arguing against Newton's absolute space: if space were a real substance, then God's choice to place the universe "here" rather than three feet to the left would be a distinction without a difference, violating the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Ernst Mach's 'The Science of Mechanics' (1883) extended the relational program to inertia, arguing in what Einstein later called "Mach's Principle" that a body's resistance to acceleration is determined not by absolute space but by its relation to the total distribution of matter in the universe. Einstein's general relativity partially vindicated this vision: spacetime geometry is shaped by the matter-energy it contains, though the theory still permits vacuum solutions — spacetimes without any matter at all.

Worldview

The relationalist sees a world in which nothing exists in isolation — every entity, every property, every event is constituted by its relations to other entities, properties, and events. There are no intrinsic, self-standing things; what appears to be an independent object is always a node in a web of connections. This produces a distinctive perceptual orientation: the relationalist attends to connections, contexts, and patterns of mutual influence rather than to isolated substances. Identity itself is relational — a thing is what it is because of how it relates to everything else. The universe is not a collection of objects in a container but a network of relationships that constitutes both the objects and the container. The framework classifies this as None: metaphysical agency reduces to the play of relations among physical events; no personal god or cosmic ordering principle stands above the relational web. The framework reads this as Constructed moral authority: norms, like objects, are constituted by the relations that produce them; no Scripture, Tradition, or stand-alone Reason has weight independent of the relational network in which it is taken up.

Moral Implications

If identity is constituted by relations, then moral obligations arise directly from the web of connections in which one is embedded. The relationalist cannot coherently claim to be a self-sufficient individual with no binding ties to others, because the very self is a product of social, biological, and physical relationships. This grounds a robust ethics of care, reciprocity, and ecological interdependence. Harm to any part of the relational web ripples through the whole, making environmental destruction and social injustice not merely unfortunate but self-undermining. Responsibility is distributed and mutual rather than purely individual.

Practical Implications

Relationalism has practical implications for network science, ecology, urban planning, and systems thinking. If reality is fundamentally relational, then interventions that treat problems in isolation — treating a disease without considering the patient's social context, managing a species without considering its ecosystem — are methodologically flawed. The relational approach favors holistic, systems-level analysis and design. In technology, it supports distributed architectures, peer-to-peer networks, and collaborative platforms over centralized, top-down systems. Environmentally, relationalism demands that ecological policy treat ecosystems as integrated wholes rather than collections of independently manageable resources.

I. Time

Time is emergent and relational — it is nothing but the ordered succession of events, not an independently existing container. Without events, there would be no time. Time's extent is both finite and infinite depending on the relational structure of events. It is continuous, linear, and uni-directional as experienced through the sequence of changing relations.

Attributes
Extent: Both Ontological Status: Emergent Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Dimensionality: One Direction: Uni-directional

II. Space

Space is relational — it is nothing but the system of spatial relations among objects (Leibniz). Space has no independent existence apart from the things it relates. Curvature is curved because the relational structure of matter shapes the geometry of space. It is local: spatial relations are defined between neighboring entities.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Curved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

Matter is emergent in the relational framework — objects are constituted by their relations rather than possessing intrinsic, independent properties. Matter is finite and conserved within the relational network, and local in the sense that material interactions are always mediated through relational proximity.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

The observer is defined by its web of relations — it exists at a specific node in a network of objects and interactions, knowing reality only through the connections it participates in. There is no knowledge from nowhere: what the observer knows is always relational and contextual, never absolute or universal. As relations shift, knowledge shifts with them; nothing is permanently fixed because meaning is constituted by relations rather than by intrinsic properties. The observer is embodied and active — it shapes and is shaped by the relational network it inhabits. Multiple observers occupy different positions in the web, each with a distinct but equally legitimate relational perspective.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Extent of Knowledge: Immediate Retainment of Knowledge: Immediate Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None Moral Authority: Constructed Theological Method: N/A

V. Energy

Energy is emergent and relational — it characterizes the dynamical relations among physical events rather than existing as an independent substance. Conservation holds as a structural feature of the relational network. Dispersibility is irreversible within the temporal ordering of relations.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Information is nothing but the set of relations among physical events — it has no independent existence apart from relational structure. It is conserved in the sense that relational structures are preserved by physical laws. The framework distinguishes scales: information is conserved at the cosmic scale because the total web of physical relations preserves its informational structure, but non-conserved at the personal-identity scale — a person is a knot of relations that unravels at death, leaving no separable self.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Relational Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous

Experiments This School Responds To (22)

Bell Test Experiments
1964 / 1982 (loophole-free, 2015) · Affirms / takes the bait
Relational quantum mechanics (Rovelli): properties exist only relative to systems with which they are correlated. There is no "view from nowhere" from which to ask …
The Michelson–Morley Experiment
1887 · Affirms / takes the bait
Vindicated. Leibniz and Mach had argued space is nothing but relations among bodies — no aether, no absolute frame. The null result removes the most …
Wigner's Friend
1961 · Affirms / takes the bait
Relational QM (Rovelli) takes Wigner's friend as the argument: properties exist only relative to systems that interact with them. There is no "view from nowhere" …
Einstein's Elevator
1907 · Affirms / takes the bait
A vindication: gravity is not an absolute force acting between bodies but a feature of relations among frames of reference. The equivalence principle is continuous …
Eddington's Eclipse Expedition
1919 · Affirms / takes the bait
A vindication: gravity is the geometry of spacetime, not a force in absolute space. The Leibniz-Mach critique of Newtonian substantivalism is empirically redeemed.
Hafele–Keating
1971 · Affirms / takes the bait
Time intervals are relational, not absolute — exactly as Leibniz argued, vindicated by precision atomic measurement.
The Pound–Rebka Experiment
1959 · Affirms / takes the bait
A clean confirmation of the local, relational character of time intervals: there is no privileged global clock; each location has its own rate determined by …
Foucault's Pendulum
1851 · Reframes the question
A Machian reading: the inertial frame the pendulum tracks is constituted by the distant fixed stars. There is no absolute space; rotation is rotation *relative …
The Cavendish Experiment
1798 · Affirms / takes the bait
A direct measurement of a relation between masses; no further metaphysical anchor in absolute space is required. The result is structural — about how masses …
LIGO Gravitational-Wave Detection
2015 (first detection); 1916 (Einstein's prediction) · Reframes the question
A challenge to strict relationalism: gravitational waves carry energy through "empty" regions, which on a strictly Leibnizian reading should be metaphysically empty. Modern relationalists concede …
Faraday's Electromagnetic Induction
1831 · Reframes the question
Action-at-a-distance gives way to mediated interaction; but the medium (field) is itself a new physical entity. Strict relationalism is pressed: empty space is not so …
Hertz's Electromagnetic Waves
1887 · Reframes the question
EM waves propagate through what 19th-century physics called "aether"; Hertz's detection seemed to confirm a substantival medium. The Michelson–Morley null result and relativity later forced …
Newton's Bucket
1687 · Denies / rejects the premise
Mach: inertial effects are produced by the total mass distribution of the universe, principally the distant stars. Rotation relative to the cosmic frame, not absolute …
Galileo's Ship
1632 · Affirms / takes the bait
A direct argument: only relative motion is physically meaningful; uniform absolute motion would have detectable consequences, but does not.
Coulomb's Torsion Balance
1785 · Reframes the question
A direct action-at-a-distance reading is uncomfortable for relationalists; the inverse-square form invites a field-mediated interpretation (Faraday, Maxwell) that handles the metaphysics better.
The Lamb Shift
1947 · Reframes the question
Empty space is doing real physical work; strict relationalism about space cannot easily accommodate the vacuum's active role.
The Aharonov–Bohm Effect
1959 · Reframes the question
The topological enclosed-flux invariant is a relational structure — the AB effect can be read relationally if gauge equivalence classes are treated as the genuine …
Lunar Laser Ranging
1969–present · Affirms / takes the bait
Spacetime geometry is empirically determined; GR's relational reading is empirically supported.
Rømer's Measurement of the Speed of Light
1676 · Affirms / takes the bait
A clean demonstration that distances are physically real, with measurable consequences for the timing of remote events.
Torricelli's Barometer
1644 · Reframes the question
The vacuum above the mercury is "empty" of matter but not metaphysically inert; later physics (electromagnetism, QFT) fills it back in. Strict Leibnizian relationalism is …
Rossi-Hall Cosmic-Ray Muon Time Dilation
1941 · Affirms / takes the bait
Time intervals are physically relational, dependent on the relative motion of clocks; muons are extraordinarily sensitive clocks.
The Casimir Effect
1948 / 1997 · Reframes the question
Strict relationalism is strained by the active vacuum; modern relationalism accepts the vacuum field as a relational structure rather than as substantival space.

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Debates Where This School Is Allied (2)

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Works that name Relationalism in their embodiments

Foundational texts that draw on this school, with each work's declared weight.

25%
Gravitation (Mid-late)
John Archibald Wheeler · 1973
25%
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Late)
Bruno Latour · 2005
20%
Fragments
Heraclitus of Ephesus · c. 500 BC
20%
Philosophical Investigations (Late)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · c. 1929–49 (drafted across two decades); 1953 (posthumous publication, ed. Anscombe & Rhees)
20%
De Motu (Mid)
George Berkeley · 1721
15%
Relativity: The Special and General Theory
Albert Einstein · 1916 (German); first English 1920
15%
The Visible and the Invisible (Late)
Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 1964 (posthumous; composed 1959-61)
15%
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Late)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke · 1715-16
15%
The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Late)
Donna J. Haraway · 2003
15%
The Science of Mechanics (Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung) (Mid)
Ernst Mach · 1883
10%
Letter on Humanism (Late)
Martin Heidegger · 1946 (drafted as a letter to Jean Beaufret); 1947 (published)
10%
Of Grammatology
Jacques Derrida · 1967
10%
On Certainty (Latest)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · Written 1949–51 (in Wittgenstein's final eighteen months); published posthumously 1969
10%
Physics and Philosophy
Werner Heisenberg · 1958 (Gifford Lectures, St Andrews, 1955–56)
10%
Discipline and Punish (Late)
Michel Foucault · 1975
10%
The Prose of the World (Mid)
Maurice Merleau-Ponty · composed 1950-52; published 1969 (posthumous)
10%
Śrī Bhāṣya (Mid)
Rāmānuja · c. 1100
10%
Lam rim chen mo (The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment) (Mid)
Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa · 1402
10%
We Have Never Been Modern (Nous n'avons jamais été modernes) (Mid)
Bruno Latour · 1991
10%
The Philosophy of Space and Time (Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre) (Mid)
Hans Reichenbach · 1928
10%
Relativity: The Special and General Theory (Mid)
Albert Einstein · 1916 (German); 1920 (English)
10%
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (La Distinction) (Mid)
Pierre Bourdieu · 1979
5%
Process and Reality (Late)
Alfred North Whitehead · 1929 (delivered as Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1927–28)
5%
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Nāgārjuna · c. 150–250 AD (South India)
5%
Monadology (Late)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · 1714 (written in French for Prince Eugene of Savoy); published 1720 in German
5%
The Heart Sutra
Anonymous (Mahāyāna tradition; some scholars argue for a Chinese composition c. 7th century) · c. 600 AD (extant form); verses possibly earlier
5%
What Is Metaphysics? (Early)
Martin Heidegger · 1929 (Freiburg inaugural lecture, 24 July)
5%
Totality and Infinity (Early)
Emmanuel Levinas · 1961
5%
The Question Concerning Technology (Late)
Martin Heidegger · 1953 (Munich lecture); 1954 (published)
5%
Modes of Thought (Late)
Alfred North Whitehead · 1938 (Wellesley & University of Chicago lectures, 1937-38)
5%
Matter and Memory (Matière et Mémoire) (Mid)
Henri Bergson · 1896
5%
Climate and Culture (Fūdo: ningengakuteki kōsatsu) (Mid)
Watsuji Tetsurō · 1935
5%
Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Late)
James Lovelock · 1979
5%
The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality (Late)
Tenzin Gyatso (14th Dalai Lama) · 2005

Personas with Relationalism as a declared influence

30%  Heraclitus of Ephesus 20%  Ernst Mach

How Relationalism resolves each dilemma

56 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 12 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 1 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas, all mainstream

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it.
On this view, money is exactly what societies do that performs the monetary functions. There is no fact about whether something is 'really' money beyond whether it is used as money. A community that decides shell beads or carbon credits or proof-of-work hashes count as …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (55%) · Money is the ledger of obligations among real people. (14%) · “Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery.
On this view, nations are made: by treaties, by wars, by deliberate institution-building, by the slow work of collective practice. There is nothing intrinsic about a national kind; what exists is the practice. What we owe the nation is what we owe any institution we …
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (55%) · A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people. (14%) · “Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice.
On this view, while biological features exist, what they socially mean — what counts as a man or a woman, what roles attach, how the categories are policed and revised — is the work of social practice. The categories are real but constructed; revising them …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (55%) · Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition. (14%) · “Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other.
On this view, biological facts about the genome exist, but what we count as 'human nature' is downstream of practice. The germline is one more thing humans now have technical access to; the question is not whether the practice transgresses an essence but whether the …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (55%) · Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric. (14%) · 'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical. (8%)
Distinctive · only 23% of schools agree (47/208)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing.
On this view, matter is genuinely there, but it isn't the floor of reality. It depends on something more fundamental — dependent origination, mind, divine sustaining act, computational substrate, or the structure of conditions — and is conserved only at its own level of description. …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (56%) · Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance. (16%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/208)
What is our place in nature?
Whether humans are masters of nature, members of nature, or makers of nature is not a question climate science can settle. It depends on what nature is, what we are, and what kind of relationship is possible between us.
Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world.
On these views, the 'nature' we live in is not a stand-alone given but something co-constituted by the categories, concepts, technologies, and practices through which we encounter it. There is a world prior to our practices, but what shows up in it as significant, real, …
Roads not taken Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. (50%) · Embedded in a web — partners with the more-than-human world. (14%) · Subject to a real natural order we did not make. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/208)
Should we colonize space?
The drive to extend human presence beyond Earth is sometimes framed as the next chapter of stewardship, sometimes as hubris, sometimes as escape from problems we ought to solve here. Which it is depends on what we take our relationship to nature to be.
The 'space frontier' is partly what we make of it.
On these views, space is not a given canvas on which we paint; it is one more domain that is constituted, in part, by the categories, practices, and imaginations we bring to it. What 'colonisation' even means is a function of frames we choose. The …
Roads not taken Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. (50%) · Colonisation continues the work that ended the wisdom of seven-generation thinking. (14%) · Nature includes its limits; colonisation is bounded by what the cosmos allows. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/208)
Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination?
Editing the genomes of the plants and animals we eat is either the natural continuation of breeding — careful improvement of what is given — or a category error that treats biology as raw material rather than as living kind.
What counts as a 'natural' genome is itself a construction.
On these views, the line between 'natural' and 'modified' organisms is partly drawn by the categories we use. Domesticated wheat, hybridised corn, selectively-bred cattle are all 'modifications' that prior generations called natural. The salient question is not whether to modify but which modifications, by whom, …
Roads not taken Genetic modification is cultivation by other means. (50%) · Editing the genome cuts into the relational fabric; we should be very slow. (14%) · Biology is what it is; we modify it within real biological constraints. (12%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop.
On this view, personhood is not a status conferred at a moment but a property of beings with certain capacities — to feel, to suffer, to prefer, eventually to reflect. A zygote has none of these; a late-term fetus has many; a newborn has most. …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (55%) · Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation. (14%) · The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it.
On this view, marriage is a human institution shaped by law, custom, and the agreements of those who enter it. There is no fixed essence to discover, only practices to negotiate. As societies change — granting women legal personhood, recognizing no-fault divorce, extending the institution …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (55%) · Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates. (14%) · “Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
31 mainstream positions
Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? Truth is mind-independent, universal, accessible in principle to all. 66% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. 50% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 47% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 47% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. 46% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditators are bounded observers reporting unusual brain states; the 'timeless' is metaphorical. 46% Does prayer change God's mind? If there is an addressee at all, it is in time; prayer is communication, and may genuinely change what comes next. 46% Are the dead morally present to the living? Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. 43% What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. 42% What makes someone the same person over time? You are your body — continuity is bodily continuity. 36% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? Same body, same person — even when the cognitive pattern has changed. 36% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? Different body, different person — you died in the scanner. 36% Is reality fundamentally digital? No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. 36% Are there indivisible units of experience? No — continuous Jamesian stream, phenomenological lived time. 36% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Reconstructed — continuous re-narrating, no fixed engrams. 36% Does history have a direction or meaning? History is not where the deepest truth lives. 36% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? Animal minds are real because biology is the substrate of mind. 31% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Brain tissue can in principle do what brains do; the question is integration. 31% What happens to "you" when you die? Death is genuinely the end. 29% Could an AI have a mind that matters? No — mind is what a biological brain does, and an LLM has no brain. 29% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? The community of persons is the moral primary. 28% How is knowledge of reality produced? Through a priori reasoning and conceptual demonstration. 24% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the practice, not the practitioner. 13% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. 13% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer. 13%
1 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
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