Work #175 · Late (his last major project) period

The History of Sexuality

Histoire de la sexualité — Foucault's three-volume genealogy of sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (1976), The Use of Pleasure (1984), The Care of the Self (1984)

Michel Foucault · 1976 (vol. 1); 1984 (vols. 2-3, shortly before Foucault's death); vol. 4 (Confessions of the Flesh) published posthumously 2018 · French · Multi-volume historical-philosophical study

Tradition: French postmodernism / Foucauldian genealogy

The "repressive hypothesis" inverted: sexuality is not what power represses but what power produces — and the genealogy of the modern sexual subject through Greek, Roman, and early Christian practices of the self

The History of Sexuality is Foucault's last major project. Volume 1, The Will to Knowledge (1976), is a methodological and historical-philosophical text that inverts the "repressive hypothesis" — the commonsense view that the Victorians repressed sexuality and we are gradually liberating it. Foucault argues the opposite: the nineteenth century was not silent about sex but produced an enormous discourse on it, classifying, normalising, and creating new categories of sexual identity. "Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." After an eight-year interval (during which Foucault's plans for the project changed considerably), Volume 2 (The Use of Pleasure) and Volume 3 (The Care of the Self) appeared in 1984, just weeks before Foucault's death from AIDS-related illness. These later volumes turn to ancient Greek and Roman practices of the self, exploring how subjects fashioned themselves through ethical practices around sexuality and pleasure. Volume 4 (Confessions of the Flesh, on early Christian sexuality) was completed but withheld at Foucault's request; finally published in 2018.

Author

Editions cited

  • The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (Robert Hurley, Pantheon, 1978)
  • The Use of Pleasure (Robert Hurley, Pantheon, 1985)
  • The Care of the Self (Robert Hurley, Pantheon, 1986)
  • Confessions of the Flesh (Robert Hurley, Pantheon, 2021; posthumous)

School Embodiments

Postmodernism · 30%
Structuralism · 10%
Pragmatic Realism · 10%
Constructivism · 10%
Dialectical Materialism · 5%
Process Philosophy · 5%
Phenomenology · 5%
Existentialism · 5%
Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism · 5%
Liberation Theology · 5%
Stoicism · 10%
Continental Philosophy · 8%
Post-Structuralism · 8%

The History of Sexuality is canonically postmodern — sexuality as discursively constructed, power as productive rather than merely repressive, the genealogical-historical method displacing essentialist analysis.

"Sexuality is not a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or an obscure domain which knowledge tries to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct." (HoS I, end of Part 4)

A complicated relation: Foucault was classified as a structuralist in the 1960s (against his own preference), and the History of Sexuality retains structuralist elements in its analysis of discursive formations.

"Discursive formations as the analytic units of power-knowledge." (HoS I, paraphrasing the methodological apparatus)

Foucault's working method is pragmatic-realist: trace what power-knowledge actually does — what discourses it produces, what subjects it constitutes, what bodies it shapes — rather than abstract critical analysis.

"What I am attempting to do is a history of truth — not what truth is, but what truth effects have been produced." (Foucault's general methodological self-description)

The History of Sexuality is the canonical constructivist analysis of sexuality — sexual identities, categories, and subjectivities are not natural givens but historical-discursive constructions.

"The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species." (HoS I, the canonical statement on identity-category production)

A complicated relation: Foucault is critical of orthodox Marxism but inherits from it the attention to material practices, productive forces, and the historical-economic embedding of intellectual life.

"Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." (HoS I)

A retrospective affinity: the genealogical method treats subjects, identities, and institutions as ongoing historical processes rather than stable substances.

"What we call 'sexuality' is the long-term effect of a complex historical process." (HoS I, paraphrasing)

A complicated relation: Foucault was phenomenologically trained but came to criticise phenomenology's assumption of a transcendental subject. The History of Sexuality is partly an analysis of how the modern phenomenological subject was historically produced.

"The subject is what is at stake in the analysis." (Foucault, paraphrasing his self-understanding from the late 1970s)

A complicated relation: Volumes 2 and 3's turn to practices of the self has existentialist elements (the subject as self-fashioning), though Foucault locates self-fashioning in concrete historical-ethical practices rather than abstract free choice.

"From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art." (Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," 1983)

A retrospective engagement: analytic philosophy of mind and social ontology (Ian Hacking, Sally Haslanger) develops Foucauldian analyses of "looping kinds" and socially constructed categories in analytic idiom.

"Categories of sexual identity as kinds that loop back on the people they categorise." (echoing HoS I via Ian Hacking)

A complicated relation: the History of Sexuality has been a major reference for liberation theology's analyses of power, discipline, and the production of subjectivity — though Foucault himself was sharply critical of universalising liberationist claims.

"Where there is power, there is resistance." (HoS I, the famous formulation)
Stoicism 10%

Volumes 2 and 3 are a sustained engagement with Hellenistic ethics — Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic practices of the self — that Foucault sees as offering an alternative to modern subjection.

"The Greco-Roman practices of the self." (HoS II-III, the major theme of the later volumes)

Continental-philosophical tradition.

Post-structuralist tradition.

Internal Tensions

The eight-year gap between Volume 1 (1976) and Volumes 2-3 (1984) marks a major shift: from the analysis of disciplinary-biopolitical power to the turn toward Greek-Roman practices of the self. Whether this is continuous development or a real break is the central interpretive question. The posthumous publication of Volume 4 (Confessions of the Flesh, 2018) — held back at Foucault's request — has reopened the question of the complete shape of his ethical project. Recent biographical scholarship on Foucault's personal life, his experiments with the Iranian Revolution, and the ethical implications of his analyses has generated fresh interpretive debate.

I. Time

Historical time as the medium of genealogical analysis; the temporality of discursive formations, not abstract physical time.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Relational Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One

II. Space

The social space of disciplinary institutions — school, hospital, prison, family — as the site where sexual subjects are produced.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

The body as the disciplinary site — biopolitics as power working on living matter.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

The subject as historically-discursively produced; plural, embodied, both shaped by power and capable of resistance through alternative practices of the self.

Attributes
Time Instance: Multiple Space Instance: Multiple Knowledge Extent: Partial Knowledge Retainment: Immediate Physicality: Embodied Agency: Both Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None

V. Energy

The energies of pleasure and discipline — the force field within which subjects are formed.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Discourse as the productive information of power-knowledge; constructed rather than discovered.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Emergent Cosmic Conservation: Non-conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Discrete

Personas that cite this work

Michel Foucault

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

How The History of Sexuality resolves each dilemma

51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 26 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed.
On this view, the cosmos has neither a temporal horizon nor a material exhaustion point. The framing of running out presupposes bounds that the cosmos doesn't have. Energy gradients perpetuate; new configurations emerge; the categories that make heat-death scary don't apply at the cosmic scale.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) · Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) · The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering.
On this view, matter and time are both unbounded at the largest scales. Terrestrial resource limits are real engineering and political constraints but not metaphysical ones; the cosmos can in principle support whatever expansion intelligence is capable of.
Roads not taken Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) · The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) · Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide?
If we owe future people a habitable planet and the material means to flourish, and the cosmos is bounded in ways that make those obligations impossible at some scale, the obligation and the possibility come apart. Where they come apart turns on what kind of finitude we live in.
Both time and matter are unbounded; we cannot in principle owe more than is possible.
On this view, the cosmos has the resources to support whatever flourishing future generations are capable of, given sufficient time and intelligence. The impossibility concern is misplaced; the real questions are about trajectories and choices, not about resource ceilings.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is not; we can owe more across long time than the matter can provide. (47%) · The owing-and-possibility question is level-dependent; we owe what is appropriate at the level we act on. (26%) · The cosmos is bounded; our obligations to future generations are bounded with it. (12%)
6 mainstream positions

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
“Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal.
On this view, gold, fiat currency, cryptocurrency, frequent-flyer miles, prison cigarettes, and the IOUs scribbled on a bar napkin are not all the same kind of thing. They share family resemblances but no common essence. Trying to define money univocally is asking a question that …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Money is the ledger of obligations among real people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
“Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together.
On this view, what we call nations are large-scale imagined communities — necessarily imagined because their members will never meet most other members, necessarily imagined as bounded and sovereign. The imagination is real and consequential; the underlying kind is not.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
“Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence.
On this view, the everyday categories of male and female pick out overlapping clusters of features — anatomy, physiology, social role, self-understanding, behaviour — that do not reduce to a single essence. The categories are useful but lossy; the demand for a single definition is …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical.
On this view, 'human nature' picks out an overlapping cluster of features — anatomical, developmental, cognitive, social — without a single essence the cluster reduces to. The question of whether germline editing is permissible doesn't turn on transgressing an essence (there isn't one) but on …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric. (15%)
Distinctive · only 23% of schools agree (47/202)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing.
On this view, matter is genuinely there, but it isn't the floor of reality. It depends on something more fundamental — dependent origination, mind, divine sustaining act, computational substrate, or the structure of conditions — and is conserved only at its own level of description. …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (55%) · Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance. (16%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 5% of schools agree (10/202)
What happens to "you" when you die?
Whether anything of you persists — and in what sense — depends on what you take a person to be.
The question presupposes a "you" that never was.
Selfhood was always a useful construction stitched together from experiences, narratives, and habits. "What happens to you?" mis-poses the issue: there was no unified thing to either survive or perish.
Roads not taken A soul continues into another mode of being. (37%) · Death is genuinely the end. (30%) · You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. (18%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there.
There is no point at which an unchanging core "comes into being"; there is a stream of conditioned arising that we choose to mark, or not mark, at various places. The political and moral question of how to treat developing humans is real; the metaphysical …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
“Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal.
On these views, “marriage” is a name applied to many overlapping but distinct social configurations across cultures and across history. To ask “what is marriage, really?” is to ask a question that doesn’t have a single answer — because there isn’t a single thing whose …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates. (15%)
Distinctive · only 13% of schools agree (26/202)
Are the dead morally present to the living?
Ancestor veneration, intercession with saints, the moral weight of a promise made to someone now gone — these all presuppose that the dead are present in some sense beyond memory. Whether they are turns on whether an observer is the kind of thing that exists in a single moment or across many.
Observers span moments; the dead are present in a real (not merely metaphorical) way.
On this view, an observer is not located at a single moment but extends across moments. The dead, on this signature, are not gone — they are elsewhere on the same trans-temporal structure that you yourself occupy. Ancestor veneration, intercession with saints, the moral weight …
Roads not taken Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. (44%) · The dead are present through divine memory, communion of saints, or ancestor presence. (35%) · From the standpoint of the One, the distinction between living and dead is conventional. (8%)
Distinctive · only 13% of schools agree (26/202)
Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom?
If God knows what you will do tomorrow, does your tomorrow-self choose freely? The classical problem of foreknowledge turns on whether the divine vantage stands outside time or inside it.
An observer can occupy multiple times at once; foreknowledge is not foreordering.
On this view, observers can in principle exist in more than one moment simultaneously — and divine omniscience is exactly the case of an observer occupying all moments at once. The future actions God 'foresees' aren't foreseen at all in the temporal sense; God simply …
Roads not taken The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. (46%) · The human observer is in time, but God's vantage is not — and foreknowledge is not foreordering. (33%) · Distinction of the One and observed time is itself conventional; the question dissolves. (8%)
26 mainstream positions
Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditation accesses a trans-temporal level the ordinary observer doesn't ordinarily reach. 13% Does prayer change God's mind? Prayer participates in a trans-temporal liturgy or communion; the question of 'changing the mind' misses the trans-temporal mode. 13% Is reality fundamentally digital? Yes — bits, quanta, computational substrate. 13% Are there indivisible units of experience? Yes — naturalist quanta of experience. 13% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Stored — discrete engrams, traces, weights. 13% What makes someone the same person over time? There was never a fixed self to either preserve or lose. 14% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? There was no fixed person to lose; care is owed to whoever is here. 14% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? There was no fixed you to either survive or fail to; the question is malformed. 14% What is our place in nature? Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world. 15% Should we colonize space? The 'space frontier' is partly what we make of it. 15% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? What counts as a 'natural' genome is itself a construction. 15% Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. 50% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 49% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 49% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the practice, not the practitioner. 14% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. 14% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer. 14% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? Talk of 'standing' presupposes fixed selves that animals (and we) don't have. 10% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Asking whether the organoid is 'really' conscious presupposes a category we don't have. 10% Could an AI have a mind that matters? The question presupposes a kind of mind that never existed in the first place. 7%
6 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
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