Work #1559 · Late period

Papers in Philosophical Logic

Lewis's 1998 collection — counterfactuals, modal logic, conditional probability

David Lewis · 1998 · English · Philosophical essay collection (Cambridge series)

Tradition: Analytic metaphysics / philosophical logic / philosophy of language

Lewis's 1998 collection — counterfactuals, modal logic, conditional probability, two-dimensional semantics

Published by Cambridge University Press in 1998, 'Papers in Philosophical Logic' is Volume One of David Lewis's Collected Papers and gathers his work on philosophical logic, counterfactuals, modal logic, conditionals, and probability. Major papers include: 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow' (1979, applying his counterfactual analysis of causation to the asymmetry of time; the principal source of contemporary asymmetry-of-time literature); 'Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities' (1976, the 'triviality result' showing that the probability of an indicative conditional cannot generally equal the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent — a result that fundamentally constrained subsequent philosophy of conditionals); 'Adverbs of Quantification' (1975, foundational for natural-language quantification); 'General Semantics' (1970, the Montague-influenced compositional-semantic programme); 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' (1968, the original statement of counterpart theory, refined in subsequent papers); 'Truth in Fiction' (1978, on the logic of fictional statements); and 'New Work for a Theory of Universals' (1983, also reprinted in Vol. II). The volume covers the philosophical-logical foundations of much of Lewis's broader metaphysical work; for many readers it is the technical companion to his more philosophically expansive Counterfactuals (1973) and On the Plurality of Worlds (1986).

Author

Editions cited

  • Papers in Philosophical Logic (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
  • Volume I of Lewis's Collected Papers (vol. II: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 1999; vol. III: Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2000)
  • Individual papers all originally published in journals 1968-1997
  • Critical commentary: Daniel Nolan, David Lewis (Acumen, 2005); Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes (Oxford, 2004)

School Embodiments

Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism · 22%
Philosophy of Language · 18%
Logicism · 14%
Structuralism · 12%
Realism · 16%
Analytic Philosophy · 8%
Modal Realism · 8%

Major analytic-philosophical-logic essays.

"Counterpart theory provides quantified modal semantics without identity across worlds." (Papers in Philosophical Logic, on counterpart theory)

Major essays on natural-language semantics.

"General Semantics." (Papers in Philosophical Logic, included)
Logicism 14%

Philosophical-logical methodology.

"Formal semantics for counterfactuals." (Papers in Philosophical Logic)

Structural account of modal and conditional logic.

"Possible-worlds structures." (Papers in Philosophical Logic)
Realism 16%

Realism about modal and counterfactual facts.

"Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow." (Papers in Philosophical Logic)

Analytic-philosophical tradition.

Modal-realist tradition.

Internal Tensions

Principal reference volume for Lewis's philosophical logic. The triviality result on conditional probabilities (1976) has been continuously discussed and is one of Lewis's most-cited papers; the time's-arrow paper (1979) shaped the contemporary discussion of temporal asymmetry; counterpart theory remains a major framework in modal metaphysics.

I. Time

1998. Lewis was 57, three years before his October 2001 death from diabetes complications.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Grain: Continuous Freedom: Deterministic Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One

II. Space

Princeton — Lewis's institutional base from 1970 until his death.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

Career-spanning essay collection (~370 pages). Lewis added brief introductions to each section.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

Late Lewis. The observer-philosopher is organising thirty years of philosophical-logical work for the first time in a single accessible collection.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Knowledge Extent: Mediated Knowledge Retainment: Partial Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: Impersonal

V. Energy

Synthesising-logical energies. The volume groups papers thematically (conditionals, counterfactuals, modal logic, probability, semantics) rather than chronologically.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Cambridge Collected Papers, vol. 1. Contains the principal Lewisian statements on counterfactuals, conditional probability, modal logic, and the foundations of natural-language semantics.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Substantival Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous

Personas that cite this work

David Lewis Saul Kripke Robert Stalnaker

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

How Papers in Philosophical Logic resolves each dilemma

34 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 6 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 23 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree (18/202)
Do you really choose?
If the brain is a physical system and physical systems are governed by laws, then every choice is also a chain of causes — which raises the question of what was really left to choose.
Choice is real within a determined order — agency and determinism aren’t opposites.
On this view, the future is determined and you are genuinely choosing. Those aren't contradictory because the determination runs through you rather than around you: your reasoning, deliberation, and assent are the way the determined outcome gets settled. Choice is what it feels like from …
Roads not taken The future is open and you are a genuine origin of it. (69%) · Choice is structural illusion — every event is fixed by the prior state. (10%) · Even if the universe is undetermined, you are not the chooser. (6%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree (18/202)
Are addicts responsible for their addiction?
Addiction looks from one angle like the textbook case of agency failing — a person doing what they don't, in any meaningful sense, want to do. From another angle it looks like agency at work in hard conditions. Which it is depends on what agency is.
The addict is genuinely responsible within a determined order.
On this view, the addict is acting within a determined order but is genuinely acting — making decisions, endorsing or resisting urges, seeking or refusing help. Responsibility attaches not because some uncaused choice happened, but because the addict is the kind of agent through which …
Roads not taken The addict could have chosen otherwise — that's why recovery is real. (69%) · The addict's behaviour is the outcome of causes; 'responsibility' is a useful fiction, not a metaphysical fact. (10%) · Even if the universe is undetermined, the addict isn't the chooser. (6%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree (18/202)
Should we hold AI systems responsible for what they do?
When an autonomous AI takes an action that harms someone, the question of who or what is responsible — the developer, the operator, the model itself — turns on whether the model is the kind of thing that can be a responsible agent.
The AI can be a genuine agent within determined conditions — and therefore genuinely responsible.
On this view, what makes a being responsible is not indeterminism but the kind of process the being is. An AI that deliberates, considers consequences, can be given reasons, and modifies its behaviour on reflection is doing what responsible agency is, even if its underlying …
Roads not taken An AI without a free will is not the kind of thing that can be responsible. (69%) · An AI's behaviour is fully determined by training and input; 'responsibility' applies if at all to its makers. (10%) · Neither AIs nor anyone else are the locus of free agency; the question is the wrong one. (6%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed.
On this view, the cosmos has neither a temporal horizon nor a material exhaustion point. The framing of running out presupposes bounds that the cosmos doesn't have. Energy gradients perpetuate; new configurations emerge; the categories that make heat-death scary don't apply at the cosmic scale.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) · Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) · The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering.
On this view, matter and time are both unbounded at the largest scales. Terrestrial resource limits are real engineering and political constraints but not metaphysical ones; the cosmos can in principle support whatever expansion intelligence is capable of.
Roads not taken Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) · The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) · Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit. (12%)
4 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Observer · 37 dilemmas, all mainstream
Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% When does a person begin? A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. 54% What is marriage? Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. 54% What is our place in nature? Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. 48% Should we colonize space? Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. 48% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Genetic modification is cultivation by other means. 48% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce. 32% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it. 32% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing. 32% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Are the dead morally present to the living? Are there indivisible units of experience? Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Could an AI have a mind that matters? Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Does history have a direction or meaning? Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Does prayer change God's mind? How is knowledge of reality produced? If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? Is memory stored or reconstructed? Is reality fundamentally digital? Is salvation, liberation, or fulfillment individual or communal? Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? What happens to "you" when you die? What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? What makes someone the same person over time? Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species?
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
← #1558 Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology All Works #1560 A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic →