Work #1484 · Mid-career, post-EPR period

Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?

Bohr's 1935 reply to Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen — Phys. Rev. 48, 696–702

Niels Bohr · 1935 · English · Scientific paper

Tradition: Copenhagen interpretation / philosophy of quantum mechanics

Bohr's 1935 reply to EPR — complementarity and the inseparability of system from measuring apparatus

Published in Physical Review 48 (1935), pp. 696-702 — same volume as Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen's 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?' (pp. 777-780, published five months earlier on 15 May 1935) — Bohr's reply takes the same title and replies in detail to the EPR thought experiment. The EPR paper had argued that quantum mechanics is incomplete: if two particles are prepared in an entangled state and then separated, measuring one allows prediction of the other with certainty; on the EPR 'criterion of reality' (an element of reality exists for any quantity that can be predicted with certainty without disturbing the system), the unmeasured particle must have had a definite position-and-momentum value all along — but quantum mechanics cannot represent this, hence quantum mechanics is incomplete. Bohr's reply argues that the EPR 'criterion of reality' rests on a tacit (and untenable) separation of the quantum system from the measuring apparatus. The famous central paragraph: 'The procedure of measurement has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in question rests. Since these conditions must be considered as an inherent element of any phenomenon to which the term physical reality can be unambiguously applied, we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially incomplete.' Bohr insists that 'unambiguous communication' about quantum phenomena requires reference to the whole experimental arrangement, and that the EPR argument's apparent demonstration of incompleteness collapses once that holism is accepted. The paper is the founding document of the modern philosophical literature on quantum non-locality and the principal Bohrian statement of the Copenhagen-interpretation response to EPR.

Author

Editions cited

  • Phys. Rev. 48 (1935), 696-702
  • Reprinted in J. A. Wheeler & W. H. Zurek (eds.), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, 1983), pp. 145-151
  • EPR companion: A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?', Phys. Rev. 47 (1935), 777-780
  • Critical context: Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue (Chicago, 1999); Don Howard, 'Einstein on Locality and Separability', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 16 (1985)

School Embodiments

Quantum Realism · 35%
Logical Positivism · 18%
Naturalism · 18%
Phenomenology · 10%
Pragmatism · 9%
Analytic Philosophy · 8%

Canonical Bohrian reply to EPR — complementarity and contextual holism.

"The procedure of measurement has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in question rests." (Phys. Rev. 48, 1935, p. 700)

Operationalist criterion — physical reality is tied to experimentally definable concepts.

"The criterion of physical reality proposed by the authors contains an essential ambiguity when applied to quantum phenomena." (Phys. Rev. 48, 1935)

Foundational paper in the philosophy-of-physics canon.

"The whole experimental arrangement must be considered." (Phys. Rev. 48, 1935)

Phenomenological emphasis on the conditions of unambiguous observation.

"Unambiguous description requires reference to the experimental conditions." (Phys. Rev. 48, 1935)

Pragmatic-experimental orientation against the EPR realist criterion.

"Reality is what we can speak about unambiguously in experimental terms." (Phys. Rev. 48, 1935)

Analytic-philosophical tradition.

Internal Tensions

The canonical Bohrian reply to EPR; the origin of the modern philosophical literature on quantum non-locality. Bell's 1964 'On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox' (which proved that local hidden variables could not reproduce quantum predictions, opening the way to the 1972 Freedman-Clauser and 1982 Aspect experiments) emerged from continued reflection on the EPR-Bohr exchange; the contemporary literature on quantum foundations remains shaped by this 1935 dispute.

I. Time

Bohr's reply submitted 13 July 1935, published 15 October 1935 — five months after EPR's 15 May 1935 publication.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Relational Grain: Continuous Freedom: NDet Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One

II. Space

Copenhagen Institute — Bohr's institutional base. The geographical-political space is pre-war Europe; both Einstein (in Princeton) and Bohr (in Copenhagen) were responding to the philosophical implications of the new quantum mechanics.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Curved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Non-local

III. Matter

Single Physical Review paper (~7 pages). Form is technical-physical with substantial philosophical argument.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Non-local

IV. Observer

Bohr as defender of the Copenhagen interpretation. The observer-physicist is at the height of his interpretive-philosophical authority over the quantum-mechanical community.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Knowledge Extent: Immediate Knowledge Retainment: Total Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: Limited

V. Energy

High-stakes polemical-philosophical energies of the EPR moment. The Bohr-Einstein dispute was the central philosophical controversy in twentieth-century physics.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Seven-page paper of huge philosophical import. The 'whole experimental arrangement' argument is the central informational structure.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Relational Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Discrete

Personas that cite this work

Niels Bohr Albert Einstein David Bohm

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

How Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? resolves each dilemma

35 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 13 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 22 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas, all mainstream

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
Money is the ledger of obligations among real people.
On relational views, money is not a substance you have; it is a record of who owes whom what. Debts and credits are real because the relations they track are real — to kin, to community, to ancestors, to land. Money is the form this …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people.
On relational views, the nation is the relational fabric — extended kinship, ancestral inheritance, shared ecology, communal practice — that hosts a people across generations. Borders matter less than belonging; lineage and land carry the weight that political structures only ratify.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · “Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition.
On relational views, identity is not a property a person has alone; it is constituted by the web of recognition the person sits in. What makes someone a man or a woman in any thick sense is the relations of kinship, community, ritual, and recognition …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · “Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric.
On relational views, what makes someone a person is the web of kinship, ancestry, and community they sit in — not a property the body carries alone. Heritable editing intervenes in exactly this fabric: the lineage that ancestors handed on, the descent that descendants will …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · 'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/202)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance.
On this view, matter is not a stuff but a patterning — the standing relations among things, ancestors, processes, and places. The creatio-ex-nihilo question doesn't quite arise, because the ontology has no slot for a free-standing substance to be created or eternal. What persists is …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (55%) · Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing. (23%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation.
On relational views, person was never the name of a thing that exists on its own — it is the name of a node in a web of recognition, obligation, kinship, and ecology. The question of when a being becomes a person is the question …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates.
On relational views, marriage is not a thing in itself but a node in a web — a configuration of obligations to children, extended kin, ancestors, ecology, and community. Its definition is what the network of relations is, and any attempt to specify it apart …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is our place in nature?
Whether humans are masters of nature, members of nature, or makers of nature is not a question climate science can settle. It depends on what nature is, what we are, and what kind of relationship is possible between us.
Embedded in a web — partners with the more-than-human world.
On these views, humans were never outside nature, and the question of our 'place in' it is the question of how to live within the relations that already constitute us. Plants, animals, rivers, ancestors, descendants are not resources or stage scenery; they are kin and …
Roads not taken Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. (48%) · Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world. (15%) · Subject to a real natural order we did not make. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Should we colonize space?
The drive to extend human presence beyond Earth is sometimes framed as the next chapter of stewardship, sometimes as hubris, sometimes as escape from problems we ought to solve here. Which it is depends on what we take our relationship to nature to be.
Colonisation continues the work that ended the wisdom of seven-generation thinking.
On relational views, space colonisation is the abstract endpoint of the same pattern that produced ecological crisis on Earth: humans treating themselves as separate from the more-than-human world they are actually inside. To go to Mars in the spirit of leaving Earth is to leave …
Roads not taken Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. (48%) · The 'space frontier' is partly what we make of it. (15%) · Nature includes its limits; colonisation is bounded by what the cosmos allows. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination?
Editing the genomes of the plants and animals we eat is either the natural continuation of breeding — careful improvement of what is given — or a category error that treats biology as raw material rather than as living kind.
Editing the genome cuts into the relational fabric; we should be very slow.
On relational views, organisms are not isolated substrates whose genomes can be edited without consequence; they are nodes in webs of mutual constitution with soils, ecologies, ancestors, and human cultivars. Genetic editing changes the node in ways the web has not had time to integrate. …
Roads not taken Genetic modification is cultivation by other means. (48%) · What counts as a 'natural' genome is itself a construction. (15%) · Biology is what it is; we modify it within real biological constraints. (12%)
13 mainstream positions
What happens to "you" when you die? You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. 18% Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce. 32% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it. 32% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing. 32% Could an AI have a mind that matters? An AI’s standing is constituted by the relations it enters. 15% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? An animal's standing is constituted by its place in the relational fabric. 11% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? The organoid's standing is constituted by the relations of care around its production. 11%
19 unaligned
Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Schools split: 49% / 37% / 8% Are the dead morally present to the living? Schools split: 44% / 35% / 13% Are there indivisible units of experience? Schools split: 44% / 37% / 13% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Schools split: 49% / 37% / 8% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Schools split: 50% / 29% / 12% Does history have a direction or meaning? Schools split: 37% / 23% / 19% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Schools split: 46% / 33% / 13% Does prayer change God's mind? Schools split: 46% / 33% / 13% How is knowledge of reality produced? Schools split: 25% / 17% / 13% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? Schools split: 36% / 29% / 14% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? Schools split: 46% / 33% / 13% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Schools split: 44% / 37% / 13% Is reality fundamentally digital? Schools split: 44% / 37% / 13% Is salvation, liberation, or fulfillment individual or communal? Schools split: 15% / 14% / 4% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? Schools split: 36% / 29% / 14% Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? Schools split: 65% / 16% / 10% What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? Schools split: 44% / 16% / 14% What makes someone the same person over time? Schools split: 36% / 29% / 14% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? Schools split: 40% / 28% / 14%
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
← #1483 Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature All Works #1485 Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge →