Work #1218 · Mid period
De Motu
George Berkeley's 1721 Latin treatise on motion — instrumentalist philosophy of physics, against Newtonian absolute space
George Berkeley
· 1721
· Latin
· Philosophy of physics / Latin treatise
Tradition: Early-modern philosophy / Philosophy of physics / Immaterialism
Berkeley's 1721 Latin treatise — instrumentalist philosophy of physics; against Newtonian absolute space
De Motu ("On Motion," 1721) is George Berkeley's Latin treatise on motion, written for the Paris Académie des Sciences competition. The work develops Berkeley's instrumentalist philosophy of physics: Newtonian absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion are not properly-real but theoretical fictions useful for computation; physical-scientific predictions can be made without ontological commitment to the absolute-Newtonian framework. Major early statement of philosophy-of-physics instrumentalism.
Author
Editions cited
- De Motu, sive de motus principio et natura, et de causa communicationis motuum (London, 1721, Latin); standard editions in Berkeley's Works
School Embodiments
Foundational text of philosophy-of-physics instrumentalism.
"Absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion are not properly-real entities; they are theoretical fictions whose usefulness lies in computation, not in correspondence to real-physical structures." (De Motu)
Idealism
20%
Major Berkeleyan idealist statement applied to philosophy of physics.
"What is real in motion is only the relative motion of bodies; absolute space and time are conceptual abstractions, not real existents." (De Motu)
Relationalism
20%
Foundational text of relationalist philosophy of space-time.
"Motion is properly the change of relative position between bodies; there is no proper-real absolute space against which motion is to be measured." (De Motu)
Empiricism
15%
Continued empiricist framework — physical-scientific claims tested by observational predictions, not by speculative-metaphysical ontology.
"The proper test of physical-scientific claims is observational; the proper-philosophical work is to clarify what observational tests can and cannot establish." (De Motu)
Pragmatism
15%
Strong anticipatory pragmatist-instrumentalist framework — physical theories as useful instruments, not necessarily as descriptions of real-physical structure.
"Newtonian theory is useful for the calculations it permits; useful does not require true in the strong-correspondence sense." (De Motu)
Berkeley's continued Anglican-philosophical framework.
"The proper philosophy of physics serves the proper-theistic conclusions; the instrumentalist analysis is consistent with this." (De Motu)
Naturalism
5%
Naturalist-philosophical engagement with physical science — though without ontological commitments to the speculative-Newtonian framework.
"The proper philosophical engagement with physical science requires both technical mastery and ontological caution." (De Motu)
Internal Tensions
De Motu was widely overlooked by contemporary Newtonian science; subsequent philosophy-of-physics work (Mach, Einstein) substantially vindicated the relationalist-instrumentalist framework.
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I. Time
The 1721 mid-Berkeley philosophical period.
Attributes
Extent: Infinite
Ontological Status: Relational
Grain: Continuous
Freedom: Deterministic
Traversability: Linear
Direction: Uni-directional
Dimensionality: One
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II. Space
The early-eighteenth-century philosophical-physical conversation.
Attributes
Extent: Infinite
Ontological Status: Relational
Curvature: Flat
Dimensionality: Three
Locality: Local
◉
III. Matter
The moving bodies whose motion the treatise analyses.
Attributes
Extent: Infinite
Ontological Status: Substantival
Conservation: Conserved
Dimensionality: Three
Locality: Local
◎
IV. Observer
The physical-philosophical investigator as proper subject.
Attributes
Time Instance: Single
Space Instance: Single
Knowledge Extent: Partial
Knowledge Retainment: Total
Physicality: Embodied
Agency: Active
Number: Plural
Metaphysical Agency: Personal
⚡
V. Energy
The proper-physical energies of motion.
Attributes
Extent: Infinite
Ontological Status: Substantival
Conservation: Conserved
Dispersibility: Irreversible
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VI. Information
The philosophy-of-physics content of the treatise.
Attributes
Ontological Status: Substantival
Cosmic Conservation: Conserved
Personal Conservation: Conserved
Granularity: Continuous
Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How De Motu resolves each dilemma
51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 6 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
Do you really choose?
If the brain is a physical system and physical systems are governed by laws, then every choice is also a chain of causes — which raises the question of what was really left to choose.
Choice is real within a determined order — agency and determinism aren’t opposites.
On this view, the future is determined and you are genuinely choosing. Those aren't contradictory because the determination runs through you rather than around you: your reasoning, deliberation, and assent are the way the determined outcome gets settled. Choice is what it feels like from …
Roads not taken
The future is open and you are a genuine origin of it. (69%) ·
Choice is structural illusion — every event is fixed by the prior state. (10%) ·
Even if the universe is undetermined, you are not the chooser. (6%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
Are addicts responsible for their addiction?
Addiction looks from one angle like the textbook case of agency failing — a person doing what they don't, in any meaningful sense, want to do. From another angle it looks like agency at work in hard conditions. Which it is depends on what agency is.
The addict is genuinely responsible within a determined order.
On this view, the addict is acting within a determined order but is genuinely acting — making decisions, endorsing or resisting urges, seeking or refusing help. Responsibility attaches not because some uncaused choice happened, but because the addict is the kind of agent through which …
Roads not taken
The addict could have chosen otherwise — that's why recovery is real. (69%) ·
The addict's behaviour is the outcome of causes; 'responsibility' is a useful fiction, not a metaphysical fact. (10%) ·
Even if the universe is undetermined, the addict isn't the chooser. (6%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
Should we hold AI systems responsible for what they do?
When an autonomous AI takes an action that harms someone, the question of who or what is responsible — the developer, the operator, the model itself — turns on whether the model is the kind of thing that can be a responsible agent.
The AI can be a genuine agent within determined conditions — and therefore genuinely responsible.
On this view, what makes a being responsible is not indeterminism but the kind of process the being is. An AI that deliberates, considers consequences, can be given reasons, and modifies its behaviour on reflection is doing what responsible agency is, even if its underlying …
Roads not taken
An AI without a free will is not the kind of thing that can be responsible. (69%) ·
An AI's behaviour is fully determined by training and input; 'responsibility' applies if at all to its makers. (10%) ·
Neither AIs nor anyone else are the locus of free agency; the question is the wrong one. (6%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree
(31/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed.
On this view, the cosmos has neither a temporal horizon nor a material exhaustion point. The framing of running out presupposes bounds that the cosmos doesn't have. Energy gradients perpetuate; new configurations emerge; the categories that make heat-death scary don't apply at the cosmic scale.
Roads not taken
Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) ·
Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) ·
The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree
(31/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering.
On this view, matter and time are both unbounded at the largest scales. Terrestrial resource limits are real engineering and political constraints but not metaphysical ones; the cosmos can in principle support whatever expansion intelligence is capable of.
Roads not taken
Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) ·
The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) ·
Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit. (12%)
4 mainstream positions
Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide?
Both time and matter are unbounded; we cannot in principle owe more than is possible.
15%
How much weight do future people deserve?
Time arises from events or from a deeper substrate — the future is not yet.
32%
Is regret rational?
The past is not a thing now; regret is the present holding what is no longer.
32%
Do we owe extinct species something we cannot give them?
Past species no longer exist; what we owe is to the present and the future.
32%
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is the world created from nothing?
Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance.
55%
Is the physical world fully real?
Yes — the physical world is fully real, mind-independent, persisting.
55%
Does matter have intrinsic moral standing?
Matter is morally considerable insofar as it is created or conserved good.
55%
What is money?
Money is a real institution with intrinsic features.
54%
What is a nation?
A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character.
54%
What makes someone male or female?
Sex is a real biological kind with given content.
54%
Should we edit the human germline?
Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given.
54%
Observer · 37 dilemmas, all mainstream
Could causation work backwards?
Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural.
68%
Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us?
The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction.
68%
Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it?
The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description.
68%
Is environmental damage ever truly permanent?
Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation.
66%
Can a civilization recover from collapse?
Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial.
66%
Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally?
Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current.
66%
When does a person begin?
A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence.
54%
What is marriage?
Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make.
54%
What is our place in nature?
Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform.
48%
Should we colonize space?
Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship.
48%
Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination?
Genetic modification is cultivation by other means.
48%
Is reality fundamentally digital?
No — continuous divine sustaining act, the Tao that knows no joints, the One's self-disclosure.
44%
Are there indivisible units of experience?
No — continuous divine presence; consciousness is the unbroken witness.
44%
Is memory stored or reconstructed?
Held in continuous divine or ancestral remembering — neither stored discretely nor purely reconstructed.
44%
What happens to "you" when you die?
A soul continues into another mode of being.
37%
Can prayer for someone far away affect them?
Prayer reaches because God or a cosmic ordering acts on the prayed-for.
37%
Are coincidences ever more than coincidence?
What looks like coincidence is providence — there is no such thing as a real coincidence.
37%
Are the dead morally present to the living?
The dead are present through divine memory, communion of saints, or ancestor presence.
35%
Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom?
The human observer is in time, but God's vantage is not — and foreknowledge is not foreordering.
33%
Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless?
Meditation participates in a real eternity — divine or cosmic — that the bounded human observer ordinarily cannot reach.
33%
Does prayer change God's mind?
God sees from outside time; prayer doesn't change God's mind, but it is part of how providence is enacted.
33%
Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it?
Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce.
32%
Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge?
Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it.
32%
Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces?
An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing.
32%
Could an AI have a mind that matters?
No — minds are not the kind of thing we engineer.
30%
Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans?
Moral standing comparable to humans requires what only humans have.
29%
Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious?
Without ensoulment, an organoid is tissue, not a person.
29%
What makes someone the same person over time?
You are a soul — what persists through change is the non-bodily aspect.
29%
Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married?
The soul persists; the cognitive change is the body's, not the person's.
29%
If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived?
The soul accompanies the person; engineering can't transfer it.
29%
Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally?
Distance doesn't dilute obligation; communion of saints / divine relation spans the cosmos.
29%
Does history have a direction or meaning?
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How is knowledge of reality produced?
—
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Is salvation, liberation, or fulfillment individual or communal?
—
—
Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed?
—
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What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
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Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species?
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Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is anything truly lost when someone forgets?
Information is conserved — the personal pattern is held even when an individual mind loses it.
39%
Does deleting your data online destroy something real?
Information at the cosmic level isn't destroyed; deletion only obscures access.
39%
Could the dead, in principle, be brought back?
The information that constitutes a person is conserved; restoration is in principle possible.
39%
Is forgiveness ontologically possible?
The offense persists ontologically; forgiveness is real moral work, but it doesn't erase what was.
39%