School #46

Pyrrhonism

Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus

Pyrrhonism practices the complete suspension of judgment (epoche) about all non-evident matters, seeking tranquility (ataraxia) through the cessation of dogmatic belief. The tradition originates with Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 BCE), who, according to ancient testimony, returned from Alexander's expedition to India profoundly skeptical about the possibility of knowing the true nature of things. Aenesidemus (1st century BCE) revived Pyrrhonian skepticism by formulating the Ten Modes (tropes) — systematic arguments showing that for every appearance, an equally compelling counter-appearance can be produced, making suspension of judgment the only rational response. Sextus Empiricus's 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism' ('Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes', c. 2nd century CE) is the most complete surviving exposition: the Pyrrhonist does not claim that nothing can be known (that would be a dogmatic assertion) but simply reports that, so far, for every argument an equal counter-argument has been found, and that suspending judgment on all non-evident matters has, unexpectedly, produced the very peace of mind (ataraxia) that the dogmatists sought through their theories.

Worldview

The Pyrrhonist experiences reality as an undecidable flux of appearances, none of which can be conclusively shown to correspond to any underlying truth. To hold this stance — or rather, to practice it, since Pyrrhonism is a practice rather than a doctrine — is to feel a distinctive lightness born of releasing the anxious grip on certainty. For every argument, an equal counter-argument presents itself; for every impression, a contradictory impression is available. Rather than despairing at this situation, the Pyrrhonist discovers that the suspension of judgment (epoche) unexpectedly produces tranquility (ataraxia). The world continues to appear, and one continues to act according to appearances, customs, and natural inclinations — but without the burden of dogmatic commitment to any theory about what lies behind the appearances. The framework classifies this as None: the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on all metaphysical agency claims (personal gods, cosmic principles, spirits), so no such agency operates within the framework's reading of the school. The framework reads this as None for moral authority: the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on every candidate normative source — Scripture, Tradition, Reason, Experience, and constructed authority alike — and lives by appearances and custom without granting any of them ultimate standing.

Moral Implications

Pyrrhonism does not prescribe a moral code, since any ethical theory is subject to the same equipollence of arguments as any other claim about non-evident matters. The Pyrrhonist follows the laws and customs of their community, the guidance of natural feelings, and the teachings of practical arts — not because these are known to be correct, but because they provide workable guides for action in the absence of theoretical certainty. This yields a distinctive ethical temperament: tolerant, non-dogmatic, and resistant to moral fanaticism. The Pyrrhonist cannot justify persecuting others for their beliefs, since no belief can be demonstrated to be superior to its opposite. Moral humility is the natural consequence of epistemic suspension.

Practical Implications

In daily life, the Pyrrhonist acts on appearances and conventions rather than on theoretical convictions, which paradoxically produces a highly functional and adaptable practical stance. Scientific and medical practice continue as the systematic observation of regularities, without ontological commitment to the theories that organize those regularities. The Pyrrhonist approach to technology is pragmatic: tools are used because they work, not because any metaphysical theory about their mechanism is endorsed. Politically, Pyrrhonism counsels caution about ideological certainty and revolutionary programs founded on dogmatic claims. The stance is a powerful antidote to fundamentalism, conspiracy thinking, and the authoritarian temptation to impose a single vision of truth.

I. Time

Time is relational and infinite — but the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment (epoché) about time's ultimate nature. Whether time is substantival, relational, or emergent cannot be determined with certainty. The Pyrrhonist notes that equally compelling arguments exist for every position on time and therefore withholds assent. Time appears continuous, linear, and uni-directional, but these are appearances about which no definitive claims can be made.

Attributes
Extent: Both Ontological Status: Relational Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Dimensionality: One Direction: Non-directional

II. Space

Space is relational — but its ultimate nature is subject to Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment. Whether space is finite or infinite, flat or curved, cannot be definitively established. The Pyrrhonist observes spatial phenomena without committing to any theory about space's underlying reality. Space appears local and three-dimensional, but these are appearances, not established truths.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Undefined Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

Matter is relational — but the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment about whether matter exists independently, what it is made of, or whether it is conserved. Equally compelling arguments can be mounted for and against any material theory. The Pyrrhonist lives practically with material appearances while withholding theoretical commitment about their ultimate nature.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

The observer is an embodied being situated in a single moment and place, confronting appearances that resist any final judgment about what lies behind them. For every argument, an equal and opposite argument can be found; for every impression, a contradictory impression is available. The Pyrrhonist suspends judgment (epochē) on all matters beyond immediate appearance, achieving a tranquility (ataraxia) born of renouncing the need for certainty. Knowledge accumulates only in the minimal sense that the observer records appearances and the history of disagreement — not in the sense of approaching truth. The observer is passive: it does not construct reality or impose meaning but simply notes what appears. Multiple observers exist, each confronting the same undecidable flux.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Extent of Knowledge: Immediate Retainment of Knowledge: Partial Physicality: Embodied Agency: Passive Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None Moral Authority: None Theological Method: N/A

V. Energy

Finite and emergent — the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on whether energy is a fundamental substance; it appears as a feature of observable phenomena without commitment to its ultimate nature. Conservation: Conserved — energy appears to be conserved in observable processes, but the Pyrrhonist makes no dogmatic claim about whether this regularity reflects a deep truth or merely a persistent appearance. Dispersibility: Irreversible — processes appear to run in one direction, but the Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies that this reflects an intrinsic feature of reality.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

The reliability of all information is suspended — one should withhold judgment about informational claims. The Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies any informational content about the world. Information is relational because it depends on the appearances, which are always perspectival. It is non-conserved because if we cannot know what information is real, we cannot know if it persists. It is continuous because the flow of appearances is seamless. The framework places this as non-conserved at both scales, since the Pyrrhonist neither affirms cosmic conservation nor personal survival — judgment is suspended on both, and the framework records this absence of commitment as non-conservation at both scales.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Relational Cosmic Conservation: Non-conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous

Experiments This School Responds To (10)

Brain in a Vat
1981 · Affirms / takes the bait
A skeptic's natural home: we cannot demonstrate we are not BIVs by any reasoning that does not first assume the external world. Suspension of judgement …
Descartes' Evil Demon
1641 · Reframes the question
Pyrrhonists welcome the doubt but reject the positive *cogito*-conclusion as itself a dogma. Suspension of judgement, not reconstruction, is the appropriate response.
Gettier Cases
1963 · Affirms / takes the bait
Skeptics welcome the result as confirmation: even apparently solid knowledge claims dissolve under pressure. Suspension of judgement remains the epistemically humble option.
The Lottery Paradox
1961 · Affirms / takes the bait
A vindication of suspending judgement: rational belief norms over-promise; the lottery makes their inconsistency visible.
The Two Envelopes Paradox
1953 · Affirms / takes the bait
Even decision theory — the supposed bedrock of rational choice — can dissolve into contradiction under sufficiently abstract setups. A vindication of skeptical caution.
The Surprise Examination Paradox
1940s · Affirms / takes the bait
Common-sense knowledge attributions dissolve under tight logical scrutiny; the paradox is one of many cases that recommend suspension of confident claims.
Russell's Five-Minute Hypothesis
1921 · Affirms / takes the bait
A clean demonstration of how thin the basis for everyday confident belief actually is. Suspension of judgement remains in good standing.
Fitch's Knowability Paradox
1963 · Affirms / takes the bait
Sharpens the skeptical conclusion: even modest epistemic principles fail under formal scrutiny. Caution about epistemic claims is structurally well-founded.
BonJour's Clairvoyant
1980 · Affirms / takes the bait
A clean case of how thin the basis for "knowledge" attributions is once we look closely. Suspension of judgement remains warranted.
Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument
2000 · Affirms / takes the bait
A formal vindication of skeptical caution about even the most apparently secure knowledge claims.

Films Reading Through This School (1)

Debates Where This School Is Allied (2)

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Works that name Pyrrhonism in their embodiments

Foundational texts that draw on this school, with each work's declared weight.

85%
Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus · c. 200 CE
65%
Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus · c. 160–210 AD
50%
Arguments Against the Stoics (Reconstructed from Cicero)
Carneades (reconstructed from Cicero) · c. mid-2nd century BCE (delivered); reconstructed from Cicero, 1st century BCE
50%
Arguments and Testimonia (Reconstructed)
Arcesilaus (reconstructed) · c. mid-3rd century BCE (original arguments); testimonia from 1st c. BCE–3rd c. CE
40%
Adversus Mathematicos (Against the Mathematicians / Professors) (Late)
Sextus Empiricus · c. 180-200 CE
30%
Academica (Academic Skepticism) (Mature)
Marcus Tullius Cicero · 45 BCE
30%
Tattvopaplavasimha
Jayarasi Bhatta · c. 8th century CE
25%
Historical and Critical Dictionary (Dictionnaire Historique et Critique) (Late)
Pierre Bayle · 1697 (2nd expanded edn 1702)
25%
The Essays (Late)
Michel de Montaigne · 1580 (Books I-II); 1588 (Book III); 1595 (posthumous augmented)
20%
The Black Swan (Late)
Nassim Nicholas Taleb · 2007
20%
Fragments (Silloi and On Nature)
Xenophanes of Colophon · c. 540–475 BCE
15%
Zhuangzi — Inner Chapters
Zhuang Zhou (with later editorial layers; Inner Chapters most likely by his hand) · c. late 4th century BC
15%
Apology (Early)
Plato · c. 399–395 BC (shortly after Socrates's death)
15%
On the Nature of the Gods (Late)
Marcus Tullius Cicero · 45 BC
15%
A Treatise of Human Nature (Early)
David Hume · Books I & II 1739; Book III 1740 (anonymously; Hume aged 28)
15%
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Late)
David Hume · Drafted 1751–61; revised continuously; published posthumously 1779
15%
On Certainty (Latest)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · Written 1949–51 (in Wittgenstein's final eighteen months); published posthumously 1969
15%
Theaetetus (Late)
Plato · c. 369 BC (late dialogue)
15%
Deliverance from Error (Late)
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī · c. 1108 (late in al-Ghazali's life, after returning to teaching)
15%
Against Method (Mid)
Paul Feyerabend · 1975 (1st edn); 1988 (2nd); 1993 (3rd)
15%
Gulliver's Travels (Late)
Jonathan Swift · 1726
15%
De Libero Arbitrio (Late (the treatise that publicly broke the Erasmus-Luther alliance, written after seven years of pressure for Erasmus to declare his position))
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam · 1524 (De Libero Arbitrio ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗ sive Collatio, Froben, Basel)
13%
Essays, Moral and Political (Middle)
David Hume · 1741-1742 (revised and expanded through 1777)
12%
The Therapy of Desire (Middle)
Martha Nussbaum · 1994
11%
The History of England (Late)
David Hume · 1754-1761 (6 volumes, composed reverse-chronologically)
10%
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Late)
David Hume · 1748 (first published as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding)
10%
Philosophical Investigations (Late)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · c. 1929–49 (drafted across two decades); 1953 (posthumous publication, ed. Anscombe & Rhees)
10%
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Nāgārjuna · c. 150–250 AD (South India)
10%
The Natural History of Religion (Late)
David Hume · 1757 (Four Dissertations)
10%
Discourse on the Method (Mid (1637, in mature middle age; preceding the Meditations of 1641))
René Descartes · 1637 (published anonymously as the preface to three scientific essays — Optics, Meteorology, Geometry)
10%
Zhuangzi
Zhuangzi (Zhuang Zhou) · c. 4th-3rd c. BC (Inner Chapters by Zhuang Zhou; Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters by later hands)
10%
Tristes Tropiques (Mid (Lévi-Strauss's most widely read book))
Claude Lévi-Strauss · 1955
10%
Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (Mid)
Theodor W. Adorno · 1944-47 (composed); 1951 (published)
10%
Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (Late)
Diogenes Laertius · c. 3rd century CE
10%
The Sceptical Chymist (Mid)
Robert Boyle · 1661
10%
Candide (Candide, ou l'Optimisme) (Late)
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) · 1759
10%
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (La condition postmoderne) (Late)
Jean-François Lyotard · 1979
10%
The Claim of Reason (Mid)
Stanley Cavell · 1979
10%
Athens and Jerusalem (Athènes et Jérusalem) (Late)
Lev Shestov · 1938
10%
The Education of Henry Adams (Late)
Henry Adams · 1907 (private printing); 1918 (public)
10%
The First and Last Freedom (Mid)
Jiddu Krishnamurti · 1954
10%
Ficciones (Mid)
Jorge Luis Borges · 1944
10%
The Blue and Brown Books (Mid)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · 1933-35 (dictations); 1958 (published posthumously)
10%
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Late)
J. L. Mackie · 1977
10%
Daodejing (Early)
Laozi (trad. attrib.) · 4th c. BCE (composite text; trad. attrib. Laozi 6th c.)
10%
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Late)
Edward Gibbon · 1776 (vol. I); 1781 (vols. II-III); 1788-89 (vols. IV-VI)
10%
Dictionnaire philosophique (Late (composed during the Ferney years))
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) · 1764 (Dictionnaire philosophique portatif, Geneva; greatly expanded through 1769)
5%
Tao Te Ching
Attributed to Laozi (Lao Tzu); likely composite, possibly c. 4th–3rd century BC · c. 4th century BC (received text); Guodian bamboo slips c. 300 BC
5%
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Early)
Ludwig Wittgenstein · 1918 (drafted in the trenches); 1921 (German pub.); 1922 (Ogden English ed.)
5%
Visuddhimagga
Buddhaghosa · c. 430 AD (composed at the Mahāvihāra monastery, Anurādhapura, Sri Lanka)
5%
The Incoherence of the Philosophers
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī · 1095 (Baghdad, immediately before his crisis and withdrawal)
5%
Of Grammatology
Jacques Derrida · 1967
5%
Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Søren Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus) · 1846
5%
Discipline and Punish (Late)
Michel Foucault · 1975
5%
Why I Am Not a Christian (Mid-late)
Bertrand Russell · 1927 (lecture); 1957 (collected essays as a book)
5%
Adagia (Long (composed across Erasmus's entire mature career))
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam · 1500 (1st edition, c. 800 adages); 1536 (final edition, c. 4,151 adages)
5%
Dialectic of Enlightenment (Mid)
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer · 1944 (private circulation); 1947 (Amsterdam edition)
5%
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Mid)
Bernard Williams · 1985
5%
Reflections on the Revolution in France (Late)
Edmund Burke · 1790
5%
The Federalist Papers (Mid)
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay · 1787-88 (Independent Journal, New York Packet, Daily Advertiser)
5%
Two Concepts of Liberty (Mid)
Isaiah Berlin · 1958 (Inaugural Lecture as Chichele Professor at Oxford)
5%
The Hedgehog and the Fox (Mid)
Isaiah Berlin · 1953
5%
The Concept of the Political (Mid)
Carl Schmitt · 1932 (revised from 1927 essay; English 1976)
5%
De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance) (Late)
Nicholas of Cusa (Nikolaus von Kues) · 1440
5%
On Nature (Peri Physeos) (Early)
Parmenides of Elea · c. 475 BCE
5%
Discourses (Diatribai) (Mid)
Epictetus (recorded by Arrian) · c. 108 CE
5%
Enchiridion (Handbook) (Late)
Epictetus (compiled by Arrian) · c. 125 CE
5%
Moralia (Ēthika) (Late)
Plutarch of Chaeronea · c. 100 CE
5%
Sic et Non (Yes and No) (Early)
Peter Abelard · c. 1121
5%
The Prince (Il Principe) (Late)
Niccolò Machiavelli · 1513 (first printed 1532)
5%
Discourses on Livy (Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio) (Late)
Niccolò Machiavelli · 1517 (published 1531)
5%
Philosophical Letters (Lettres Philosophiques / Lettres Anglaises) (Mid)
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) · 1734
5%
Utopia (De Optimo Reipublicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia) (Mid)
St. Thomas More · 1516
5%
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Late)
Giorgio Agamben · 1995
5%
Orthodoxy (Mid)
G.K. Chesterton · 1908
5%
The Age of Reason (Late)
Thomas Paine · 1794 (Part I); 1795 (Part II); 1807 (Part III)
5%
Don Quixote (El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha) (Late)
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra · 1605 (Part I); 1615 (Part II)
5%
Waiting for Godot (En attendant Godot) (Mid)
Samuel Beckett · 1948-49 (composed); 1952 (French publication); 1953 (premiere)
5%
Invisible Cities (Le città invisibili) (Mid)
Italo Calvino · 1972
5%
One Hundred Years of Solitude (Cien años de soledad) (Mid)
Gabriel García Márquez · 1967
5%
The Science of Mechanics (Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung) (Mid)
Ernst Mach · 1883
5%
The Trial (Der Process) (Late)
Franz Kafka · 1914-15 (composed); 1925 (posthumous)
5%
1984 (Nineteen Eighty-Four) (Late)
George Orwell (Eric Arthur Blair) · 1949
5%
The Unbearable Lightness of Being (Nesnesitelná lehkost bytí) (Late)
Milan Kundera · 1984
5%
Language, Truth, and Logic (Early)
A.J. Ayer · 1936
5%
The Order of Time (Late)
Carlo Rovelli · 2017 (Italian); 2018 (English)
5%
The Castle (Late)
Franz Kafka · 1922 (composed); 1926 (posthumous)
5%
The Bacchae (Late)
Euripides · c. 405 BCE (posthumous; performed 405)
5%
The Picture of Dorian Gray (Late)
Oscar Wilde · 1890 (Lippincott's); 1891 (revised book)
5%
History of the Peloponnesian War (Early)
Thucydides · c. 431-411 BCE (unfinished at Thucydides's death)
5%
The Histories (Early)
Herodotus · c. 440s-420s BCE
5%
Parallel Lives (Late)
Plutarch (Mestrius Plutarchus) · c. 96-119 CE
5%
Moby-Dick (Mid)
Herman Melville · 1850-51
5%
Blood Meridian (Late)
Cormac McCarthy · 1985
5%
Hopscotch (Mid)
Julio Cortázar · 1963 (Spanish Rayuela); 1966 (English)
5%
2666 (Late)
Roberto Bolaño · 2001-03 (composed during fatal illness); 2004 (posthumous)
5%
The Unreality of Time (Late)
J. M. E. McTaggart · 1908
5%
Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? (Mid)
Nick Bostrom · 2003 (Philosophical Quarterly)
5%
Tusculan Disputations (Late (composed in the year of Cicero's daughter's death, in his most intense period of philosophical writing))
Marcus Tullius Cicero · 45 BC (Tusculanae Disputationes; composed at Tusculum after the death of his daughter Tullia)
5%
Colloquia (Mature (the work that grew through Erasmus's most productive decades and was repeatedly enlarged))
Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam · 1518 (first edition Familiarium Colloquiorum Formulae); enlarged 1519, 1522, 1524, 1526, 1529, 1533
5%
Ocean of Reasoning (Mature (Tsongkhapa's major philosophical-Madhyamaka work))
Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa · c. 1407
5%
Traité sur la tolérance (Late (the campaign-treatise of the Ferney period))
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) · 1763 (Traité sur la tolérance à l'occasion de la mort de Jean Calas)

Personas with Pyrrhonism as a declared influence

80%  Sextus Empiricus 45%  Carneades 45%  Arcesilaus 30%  Jayarasi Bhatta 25%  Marcus Tullius Cicero 20%  David Hume 20%  Zhuangzi (Zhuang Zhou) 20%  Gaunilo of Marmoutiers 15%  William Shakespeare 15%  Ludwig Wittgenstein 15%  Diogenes of Sinope (the Cynic) 15%  Protagoras of Abdera 15%  Nāgārjuna 15%  Euripides 15%  Xenophanes of Colophon 10%  Socrates 10%  Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī 10%  Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus 10%  Democritus of Abdera

How Pyrrhonism resolves each dilemma

56 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 23 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 1 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/208)
Do you really choose?
If the brain is a physical system and physical systems are governed by laws, then every choice is also a chain of causes — which raises the question of what was really left to choose.
Even if the universe is undetermined, you are not the chooser.
On this view, the indeterminacy of the universe — whether from quantum mechanics, sheer contingency, or something else — does nothing to recover meaningful choice. A coin-flipping brain is not a deliberating brain; randomness in the underlying physics doesn't translate into power for the observer. …
Roads not taken The future is open and you are a genuine origin of it. (69%) · Choice is structural illusion — every event is fixed by the prior state. (10%) · Choice is real within a determined order — agency and determinism aren’t opposites. (10%)
Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/208)
Are addicts responsible for their addiction?
Addiction looks from one angle like the textbook case of agency failing — a person doing what they don't, in any meaningful sense, want to do. From another angle it looks like agency at work in hard conditions. Which it is depends on what agency is.
Even if the universe is undetermined, the addict isn't the chooser.
On this view, the indeterminacy of the universe does nothing to convert an addict's brain into a responsible chooser. Randomness is not freedom. The addict is being acted on by neurochemistry, by environment, by craving; the appearance of agency is downstream of these. Compassion is …
Roads not taken The addict could have chosen otherwise — that's why recovery is real. (69%) · The addict's behaviour is the outcome of causes; 'responsibility' is a useful fiction, not a metaphysical fact. (10%) · The addict is genuinely responsible within a determined order. (10%)
Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/208)
Should we hold AI systems responsible for what they do?
When an autonomous AI takes an action that harms someone, the question of who or what is responsible — the developer, the operator, the model itself — turns on whether the model is the kind of thing that can be a responsible agent.
Neither AIs nor anyone else are the locus of free agency; the question is the wrong one.
On this view, the same reasons that undermine ordinary claims of human agency apply with equal force to AI. The brain is a coin-flipping organ; the model is a function on inputs. Neither is the kind of thing that can be the source of action …
Roads not taken An AI without a free will is not the kind of thing that can be responsible. (69%) · An AI's behaviour is fully determined by training and input; 'responsibility' applies if at all to its makers. (10%) · The AI can be a genuine agent within determined conditions — and therefore genuinely responsible. (10%)
6 mainstream positions

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/208)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
“Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal.
On this view, gold, fiat currency, cryptocurrency, frequent-flyer miles, prison cigarettes, and the IOUs scribbled on a bar napkin are not all the same kind of thing. They share family resemblances but no common essence. Trying to define money univocally is asking a question that …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (55%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Money is the ledger of obligations among real people. (14%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/208)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
“Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together.
On this view, what we call nations are large-scale imagined communities — necessarily imagined because their members will never meet most other members, necessarily imagined as bounded and sovereign. The imagination is real and consequential; the underlying kind is not.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (55%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people. (14%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/208)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
“Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence.
On this view, the everyday categories of male and female pick out overlapping clusters of features — anatomy, physiology, social role, self-understanding, behaviour — that do not reduce to a single essence. The categories are useful but lossy; the demand for a single definition is …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (55%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition. (14%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/208)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical.
On this view, 'human nature' picks out an overlapping cluster of features — anatomical, developmental, cognitive, social — without a single essence the cluster reduces to. The question of whether germline editing is permissible doesn't turn on transgressing an essence (there isn't one) but on …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (55%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric. (14%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/208)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance.
On this view, matter is not a stuff but a patterning — the standing relations among things, ancestors, processes, and places. The creatio-ex-nihilo question doesn't quite arise, because the ontology has no slot for a free-standing substance to be created or eternal. What persists is …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (56%) · Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing. (23%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 2% of schools agree (5/208)
Could causation work backwards?
If the laws of physics are time-symmetric, what makes causes precede their effects? And if the asymmetry isn't metaphysical, could retroactive causation be coherent?
Past, present, and future are conventional designations; the question doesn't quite arise.
On this view, the categories of past, present, and future are useful designations rather than real directions of an underlying time. The question of whether causation could run backward presupposes the directionality the view denies. Causation just is the pattern of correlation we find; calling …
Roads not taken Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. (68%) · Time is structured as return; 'forward' and 'backward' are local features of the cycle. (18%) · From the One's vantage, causation itself is a conventional category. (8%)
Distinctive · only 2% of schools agree (5/208)
Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us?
You remember the past but anticipate the future. Whether that asymmetry tracks something deep about time, or just something contingent about how minds happen to be wired, depends on what direction time has.
The categories of memory and anticipation are conventional; their asymmetry is what we built.
On this view, calling some experiences 'memories' and others 'anticipations' is a useful categorisation. The asymmetry between them tracks the categorisation, not a deeper temporal structure. The question of whether we could 'really' remember the future is a question about category use, not metaphysics.
Roads not taken The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. (68%) · Memory and anticipation are phases of a cycle that visits both directions. (18%) · From the One's vantage, memory and anticipation are themselves conventional. (8%)
Distinctive · only 2% of schools agree (5/208)
Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it?
Penrose, Carroll, and many cosmologists argue the arrow of time is built into the cosmos's specific initial low-entropy state. Others read it as a feature of perspective. The question's answer changes what time is.
There is no fact about whether time has an arrow; the question is metaphysical posing.
On this view, the question of whether time has a real arrow is itself a question that doesn't admit of a definite answer. Different conventions of description produce different framings; no convention is more accurate than another to a single underlying fact. The Penrose-Carroll dispute …
Roads not taken The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. (68%) · Within a cycle there is a direction; across the cycle there isn't. (18%) · From the One's vantage, the arrow of time itself is a conventional feature. (8%)
Distinctive · only 5% of schools agree (10/208)
What happens to "you" when you die?
Whether anything of you persists — and in what sense — depends on what you take a person to be.
The question presupposes a "you" that never was.
Selfhood was always a useful construction stitched together from experiences, narratives, and habits. "What happens to you?" mis-poses the issue: there was no unified thing to either survive or perish.
Roads not taken A soul continues into another mode of being. (38%) · Death is genuinely the end. (29%) · You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. (18%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/208)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there.
There is no point at which an unchanging core "comes into being"; there is a stream of conditioned arising that we choose to mark, or not mark, at various places. The political and moral question of how to treat developing humans is real; the metaphysical …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (55%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation. (14%)
31 mainstream positions
What is marriage? “Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. 8% What is our place in nature? Subject to a real natural order we did not make. 12% Should we colonize space? Nature includes its limits; colonisation is bounded by what the cosmos allows. 12% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Biology is what it is; we modify it within real biological constraints. 12% What makes someone the same person over time? There was never a fixed self to either preserve or lose. 14% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? There was no fixed person to lose; care is owed to whoever is here. 14% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? There was no fixed you to either survive or fail to; the question is malformed. 14% Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? Truth is real but always known from a perspective. 16% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. 50% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 47% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 47% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. 46% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditators are bounded observers reporting unusual brain states; the 'timeless' is metaphorical. 46% Does prayer change God's mind? If there is an addressee at all, it is in time; prayer is communication, and may genuinely change what comes next. 46% Are the dead morally present to the living? Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. 43% What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. 42% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? The discrete person is the moral primary. 38% Is reality fundamentally digital? No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. 36% Are there indivisible units of experience? No — continuous Jamesian stream, phenomenological lived time. 36% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Reconstructed — continuous re-narrating, no fixed engrams. 36% Does history have a direction or meaning? History is not where the deepest truth lives. 36% How is knowledge of reality produced? Through careful description of lived experience. 12% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? Talk of 'standing' presupposes fixed selves that animals (and we) don't have. 10% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Asking whether the organoid is 'really' conscious presupposes a category we don't have. 10% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the method, not the institutions or the persons — and remain wary. 8% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is not knowledge in the descriptive-empirical sense. 8% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM produces tokens; calling that 'knowledge' is a measurement choice. 8% Could an AI have a mind that matters? The question presupposes a kind of mind that never existed in the first place. 7%
1 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
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