Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
What makes someone the same person over time?
When dementia hollows out memory, when a coma resolves with no recall, when you imagine being uploaded — the question of whether the surviving person is still you turns on what kind of thing the 'you' was to begin with.
You span moments — identity is a pattern that need not be located at a single now.
On this view, the observer is not bound to a single present. Identity is something that exists across moments — as a pattern, an ancestral line, a trans-temporal structure. Uploading, in this picture, is not a metaphysical impossibility but an engineering question; ancestors are real …
Roads not taken
You are your body — continuity is bodily continuity. (36%) ·
You are a soul — what persists through change is the non-bodily aspect. (29%) ·
There was never a fixed self to either preserve or lose. (14%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married?
Loss of memory, of recognition, of the cognitive patterns that made the person — does this end the person, or merely the person you knew? The answer turns on what makes someone who they are.
The person is the pattern across moments — diminished pattern, diminished person.
On this view, the person is constituted by a pattern extending across moments — memory, narrative, characteristic ways of being. As dementia erodes the pattern, the person is correspondingly diminished. What remains is real but is less than what was; the marriage to the person …
Roads not taken
Same body, same person — even when the cognitive pattern has changed. (36%) ·
The soul persists; the cognitive change is the body's, not the person's. (29%) ·
There was no fixed person to lose; care is owed to whoever is here. (14%)
Distinctive · only 9% of schools agree
(18/202)
If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived?
The Star Trek transporter problem: a machine scans your body atom by atom, transmits the pattern, builds an exact duplicate at the destination, and dismantles the original. Whether you arrive at the destination or die in the scanner is the question; the answer depends on what you are.
You are the pattern; the pattern survives the substrate change. You arrive.
On this view, you are the trans-temporal pattern that has shown up in this body up to now. The teleporter preserves the pattern — destroys one instance, builds another — and the pattern is what matters. You step in and you step out. The fact …
Roads not taken
Different body, different person — you died in the scanner. (36%) ·
The soul accompanies the person; engineering can't transfer it. (29%) ·
There was no fixed you to either survive or fail to; the question is malformed. (14%)
Distinctive · only 13% of schools agree
(26/202)
Are the dead morally present to the living?
Ancestor veneration, intercession with saints, the moral weight of a promise made to someone now gone — these all presuppose that the dead are present in some sense beyond memory. Whether they are turns on whether an observer is the kind of thing that exists in a single moment or across many.
Observers span moments; the dead are present in a real (not merely metaphorical) way.
On this view, an observer is not located at a single moment but extends across moments. The dead, on this signature, are not gone — they are elsewhere on the same trans-temporal structure that you yourself occupy. Ancestor veneration, intercession with saints, the moral weight …
Roads not taken
Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. (44%) ·
The dead are present through divine memory, communion of saints, or ancestor presence. (35%) ·
From the standpoint of the One, the distinction between living and dead is conventional. (8%)
Distinctive · only 13% of schools agree
(26/202)
Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom?
If God knows what you will do tomorrow, does your tomorrow-self choose freely? The classical problem of foreknowledge turns on whether the divine vantage stands outside time or inside it.
An observer can occupy multiple times at once; foreknowledge is not foreordering.
On this view, observers can in principle exist in more than one moment simultaneously — and divine omniscience is exactly the case of an observer occupying all moments at once. The future actions God 'foresees' aren't foreseen at all in the temporal sense; God simply …
Roads not taken
The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. (46%) ·
The human observer is in time, but God's vantage is not — and foreknowledge is not foreordering. (33%) ·
Distinction of the One and observed time is itself conventional; the question dissolves. (8%)