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Work #1477 · Late period

Context

Stalnaker's 2014 monograph — the common-ground model of conversation, two decades on

Robert Stalnaker · 2014 · English · Philosophical monograph

Tradition: Analytic philosophy of language / pragmatics / philosophy of mind

Stalnaker's 2014 monograph — the common-ground model of conversation, refined and applied

Published by Oxford University Press in 2014, 'Context' is Stalnaker's late book-length development of the common-ground theory of conversation he first sketched in his 1970s papers (especially 'Assertion', 1978) and systematised in 'Inquiry' (1984). Across eight chapters, the book treats: (I) Context — the formal-philosophical apparatus of contexts as sets of possible worlds; (II) The Dynamics of Conversation — how the common ground evolves through speech acts; (III) Common Ground — the central conceptual structure; (IV) Truth and Knowledge — the relations between truth, knowledge, and the common ground; (V) Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem — engagement with David Lewis's contemporary work on self-location and contemporary discussions of the Sleeping Beauty problem; (VI) Context and Self-Knowledge — extending the common-ground framework to introspective questions; (VII) Iterated Common Ground — the higher-order structure of common ground; (VIII) Conditional Belief and Common Ground — the integration with the broader Stalnakerian programme on conditionals. The book is the most extensive single statement of the common-ground framework Stalnaker had been developing for four decades; it integrates philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and formal pragmatics in a single coherent framework. It is Stalnaker's final major systematic statement (after Inquiry 1984, Context and Content 1999, Ways a World Might Be 2003, Our Knowledge of the Internal World 2008).

Author

Editions cited

  • Context (Oxford University Press, 2014)
  • Companion volumes: Inquiry (MIT, 1984); Context and Content (Oxford, 1999); Ways a World Might Be (Oxford, 2003); Our Knowledge of the Internal World (Oxford, 2008)
  • Critical context: Daniel Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary (MIT, 2004); Maria Aloni and Paul Dekker (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics (Cambridge, 2016)
Compare this work

School Embodiments

Philosophy of Language · 28%
Pragmatism · 22%
Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism · 16%
Naturalism · 12%
Empiricism · 12%
Structuralism · 10%
Analytic Philosophy · 8%
Philosophy of Language 28%

Late mature statement of Stalnaker's pragmatic philosophy of language.

"The common ground is the central explanatory notion for conversational pragmatics." (Context, ch. 1)
Pragmatism 22%

Defining pragmatic-conversational theory of context.

"Pragmatics is not a residual category but a central part of meaning." (Context, ch. 2)
Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism 16%

Possible-worlds machinery applied to dynamic conversational context.

"Context is a set of possible worlds — the common ground." (Context, ch. 1)
Naturalism 12%

Naturalistic-functional view of conversation.

"Conversation is a natural cooperative activity." (Context, ch. 3)
Empiricism 12%

Connects pragmatics to broader questions in social epistemology.

"Common ground is a social-epistemic structure." (Context, ch. 6)
Structuralism 10%

Structural account of conversational dynamics.

"The dynamics of common ground form a structured update mechanism." (Context, ch. 4)
Analytic Philosophy 8%

Analytic-philosophical tradition.

Internal Tensions

The mature late-Stalnaker statement of his pragmatic-philosophical programme. The common-ground framework has been continuously productive in formal pragmatics, dynamic semantics, and philosophy of language; the integration with self-knowledge and Sleeping Beauty-style epistemological problems shows the framework's continued generative power.

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I. Time

2014. Stalnaker was 74 and had retired from MIT teaching but remained philosophically productive.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Grain: Continuous Freedom: NDet Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One
✦

II. Space

MIT / Oxford analytic milieu. The book is the product of a long career at MIT (since 1988) with continuing engagement with the Oxford and broader Anglophone analytic-philosophy community.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Curvature: Curved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local
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III. Matter

Late-career systematic monograph (~190 pages). Form is sustained philosophical argument across eight chapters integrating the common-ground framework with adjacent philosophical topics.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local
◎

IV. Observer

Late Stalnaker. The observer-philosopher is positioned at the close of a four-decade research programme, integrating its principal results in a final systematic statement.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Knowledge Extent: Immediate Knowledge Retainment: Total Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: Impersonal
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V. Energy

Late-systematic energies of a four-decade research programme. The book is the final major statement of the Stalnakerian philosophical-linguistic programme.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible
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VI. Information

Single book consolidating the common-ground theory. The Sleeping Beauty engagement (Chapter V) and the iterated-common-ground analysis (Chapter VII) are the most technically novel material.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Substantival Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous

Personas that cite this work

Robert Stalnaker David Lewis David J. Chalmers

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

97%
John Searle
33/34
97%
Robert Stalnaker
33/34
94%
Ernst Cassirer
32/34
94%
Karl Popper
32/34
94%
Roy Bhaskar
32/34
93%
Diogenes of Sinope (the Cynic)
28/30

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

62%
Stoicism
21/26
60%
Presentism
22/26
58%
Deontological Ethics
22/26
58%
Structuralism
20/26
57%
Classical Greek Thought
20/26
57%
Cognitivism (Mind)
21/26
57%
Critical Realism
21/26
56%
Virtual Realism
20/26

How Context resolves each dilemma

31 resolved positions across 4 dimensions · 26 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas, all mainstream
How much weight do future people deserve? Future people are as real as you are — and their interests count for as much. 47% Is regret rational? The past is as real as the present; regret is a real attitude toward a real thing. 47% Do we owe extinct species something we cannot give them? Extinct species are as real as we are; they have standing. 47% Is the universe running out of usable energy? Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. 47% Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so? Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. 47% Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide? Time is unbounded but matter is not; we can owe more across long time than the matter can provide. 47% Are addicts responsible for their addiction? — — Do you really choose? — — Should we hold AI systems responsible for what they do? — —
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is the world created from nothing? Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. 56% Is the physical world fully real? Yes — the physical world is fully real, mind-independent, persisting. 56% Does matter have intrinsic moral standing? Matter is morally considerable insofar as it is created or conserved good. 56% What is money? Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. 55% What is a nation? A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. 55% What makes someone male or female? Sex is a real biological kind with given content. 55% Should we edit the human germline? Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. 55%
Observer · 37 dilemmas, all mainstream
Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% When does a person begin? A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. 55% What is marriage? Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. 55% What is our place in nature? Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. 50% Should we colonize space? Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. 50% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Genetic modification is cultivation by other means. 50% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce. 31% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it. 31% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing. 31% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? — — Are the dead morally present to the living? — — Are there indivisible units of experience? — — Can prayer for someone far away affect them? — — Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? — — Could an AI have a mind that matters? — — Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? — — Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? — — Does history have a direction or meaning? — — Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? — — Does prayer change God's mind? — — How is knowledge of reality produced? — — If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? — — Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? — — Is memory stored or reconstructed? — — Is reality fundamentally digital? — — Is salvation, liberation, or fulfillment individual or communal? — — Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? — — Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? — — What happens to "you" when you die? — — What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? — — What makes someone the same person over time? — — Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? — —
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is anything truly lost when someone forgets? Information is lost when a mind forgets; matter and energy continue, but the pattern is gone. 50% Does deleting your data online destroy something real? Information is genuinely lost when the substrate that hosted it goes; deletion really destroys. 50% Could the dead, in principle, be brought back? The information dissipates with the substrate; restoration is in principle impossible. 50% Is forgiveness ontologically possible? The offense is locally constituted by its substrate; when the substrate dissolves, the offense genuinely passes away. 50%
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