What Is Metaphysics?
Was ist Metaphysik? — Heidegger's inaugural lecture at Freiburg, 1929
Tradition: Continental philosophy / phenomenology
Why is there something rather than nothing? — the question of being approached through the experience of dread (Angst)
What Is Metaphysics? is Heidegger's inaugural lecture on succeeding Husserl in the Freiburg chair of philosophy. It develops a phenomenological approach to the question of being through the analysis of Nothingness — accessible to us in the fundamental mood of anxiety (Angst), which discloses beings as a whole precisely by slipping away from us. The lecture's closing question — "Why is there something rather than nothing?" — has become the most-quoted single line of twentieth-century continental philosophy. Heidegger added a Postscript in 1943 and an Introduction in 1949 reflecting on the lecture's reception and its place in his developing thought. The work was Carnap's principal target in his 1932 attack on metaphysics, and it stands at the centre of the analytic-continental divide.
Author
Editions cited
- Pathmarks (William McNeill, ed., Cambridge, 1998)
- Basic Writings (David Farrell Krell, Harper, 1977; revised 1993)
School Embodiments
The lecture continues the phenomenological method Heidegger developed in Being and Time, applied to the fundamental question of being.
"Why is there something rather than nothing?" (What Is Metaphysics?, closing)
The analysis of anxiety as the mood disclosing the Nothing influenced Sartre, de Beauvoir, Tillich, and the entire existentialist tradition.
"Anxiety is the fundamental mood through which we are held out into the Nothing." (What Is Metaphysics?, paraphrasing)
Derrida, Foucault, and Vattimo all engaged this text closely. The destabilisation of substance-metaphysics anticipates postmodern critiques.
"The Nothing nothings." (Das Nichts nichtet — Carnap's favourite target sentence)
Graham Harman and OOO read the late Heidegger's engagement with being and beings as a precursor to a flat ontology of objects.
"To make beings as a whole available, to comport ourselves toward them as beings — this is metaphysics." (What Is Metaphysics?)
The lecture's engagement with the Nothing has been read by critics as a flirtation with philosophical nihilism. Heidegger's response in the later Postscript distinguishes his position from nihilism explicitly.
"Held out into the Nothing — Dasein is in each case essentially beyond beings as a whole." (What Is Metaphysics?)
The treatment of beings as gathered in their relations with each other and with Dasein's understanding has relational-ontological resonances.
"Beings are not arranged for us in a steady, unchanging order." (What Is Metaphysics?)
Carnap's 1932 essay "Overcoming Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" treated this lecture as the paradigm of metaphysical nonsense. The work is the central document of the analytic-continental divide.
"What is the Nothing? The Nothing itself nothings." (What Is Metaphysics?, the line Carnap mocked)
Continental-philosophical tradition.
Internal Tensions
The 1929 lecture sits between Being and Time and the later Kehre. Its treatment of the Nothing has been criticised (Carnap) as confused metaphysics and defended (post-structuralists) as a profound destabilisation of substance ontology. Heidegger's subsequent Postscript and Introduction were attempts to clarify the position against both readings.
I. Time
Time as the horizon of being is taken over from Being and Time. Anxiety discloses time in a particular way — the moment of being-toward-death is the temporal core of the analysis.
Attributes
II. Space
Relational treatment of space; not theorised directly in this lecture.
Attributes
III. Matter
Beings as a whole are encountered relationally; matter is one mode of being among others.
Attributes
IV. Observer
Dasein remains the analytical centre. Anxiety is the fundamental mood through which the Nothing is disclosed.
Attributes
V. Energy
Not engaged.
Attributes
VI. Information
Truth as unconcealment (aletheia) is the relational informational structure. No personal-conservation commitment.
Attributes
Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How What Is Metaphysics? resolves each dilemma
51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 23 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
6 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.