Judgment Under Uncertainty
Heuristics and Biases — Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky's 1982 founding volume of the heuristics-and-biases programme
Tradition: Cognitive psychology / Behavioural economics
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky's 1982 volume gathering the founding papers of the heuristics-and-biases programme
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982), edited by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, gathers the founding papers of the heuristics-and-biases research programme — including Tversky-Kahneman's "Judgment under Uncertainty" (1974), papers on representativeness, availability, anchoring-and-adjustment, and conjunction-fallacy. The volume established the experimental psychology of systematic deviations from rational-choice models and laid the foundation for what would become behavioural economics.
Author
Editions cited
- Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, eds. Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky (Cambridge UP, 1982)
School Embodiments
Founding programme of the heuristics-and-biases tradition within cognitive psychology.
"The intuitive judgments of probability and frequency that people make are systematic and predictable, but they do not conform to the rules of probability theory." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Foundational text — without these results behavioural economics as an organised programme does not exist.
"The empirical departures from the maximisation-of-expected-utility model are not random; they are systematic." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Subsequent evolutionary-psychological work has treated heuristics as ecologically rational adaptations.
"What looks like a bias from the perspective of formal probability may reflect a sensible cognitive strategy for the typical human environment." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Naturalises judgment as empirically describable psychological process rather than normative ideal.
"Probability theory describes how rational judgment should work; cognitive psychology describes how it actually works." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Engages the analytic-philosophical literature on probability and rationality.
"The normative theory of probability and the descriptive theory of judgment are distinct enterprises." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Realist about cognitive structures — heuristics are real psychological mechanisms.
"Heuristics are not heuristic devices that subjects deploy; they are the way the mind works." (Judgment Under Uncertainty)
Internal Tensions
The programme has been variously assessed — Gigerenzer's "ecological rationality" school argues many "biases" are sensible in their natural environments; the heuristics-and-biases tradition has dominated mainstream behavioural-decision research.
I. Time
The 1970s experimental psychology programme — Israeli and American academic settings.
Attributes
II. Space
The laboratory and the natural decision-making environments tested.
Attributes
III. Matter
The embodied cognitive processes of human subjects.
Attributes
IV. Observer
The experimental psychologist as subject of and to systematic biases.
Attributes
V. Energy
The cognitive energies of judgment under uncertainty.
Attributes
VI. Information
The probabilistic information that subjects process — often unfaithfully.
Attributes
Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How Judgment Under Uncertainty resolves each dilemma
44 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 9 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 13 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
4 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.