The Concept of Nature
Whitehead's 1920 Tarner Lectures — the early statement of his philosophy of nature, against the "bifurcation of nature" into primary and secondary qualities
Tradition: Process philosophy / philosophy of nature
Against the "bifurcation of nature" into primary and secondary qualities — Whitehead's 1920 philosophy of nature as a single integrated event-process
The Concept of Nature is one of Whitehead's three pre-process-philosophical lecture series (with An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, 1919, and The Principle of Relativity, 1922) and the most philosophically accessible. The book's central polemic is against the "bifurcation of nature" — the post-Galilean separation of nature into the mathematically-physically real (primary qualities of extension, motion, etc.) and the merely subjective-secondary (colour, sound, beauty). Whitehead argues that this bifurcation is philosophically untenable: the colour of the sunset is as much in nature as the wavelength of light, and any adequate philosophy of nature must include both. The constructive proposal is a metaphysics of events: nature is a continuous process of events with relations of extension over one another. The book is the early philosophical-physical statement that develops into the mature process metaphysics of Process and Reality (1929). The Concept of Nature has been the central reference for subsequent engagement with Whitehead's philosophy of science.
Author
Editions cited
- The Concept of Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1920; reprinted Cosimo, 2007)
School Embodiments
The Concept of Nature is the early-philosophical-statement of the process framework that develops into the mature metaphysics of Process and Reality.
"Nature is a structure of evolving processes." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
Whitehead's philosophy of nature is realist — there is a real natural world with real qualities (both primary and secondary), discovered rather than merely constructed.
"Nature's real qualities include both what science measures and what perception discloses." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A complicated relation: Whitehead is naturalist in taking nature as the relevant subject of his philosophy, while critiquing reductive scientific naturalism's bifurcation of nature.
"Nature including its qualities is the relevant subject of natural philosophy." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A retrospective affinity: Whitehead's attention to lived perception of nature, against abstract scientific categories, has phenomenological structure that subsequent process-phenomenological dialogue has developed.
"The lived perception of nature as the starting point of philosophy." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A complicated relation: Whitehead's analytic-mathematical training shapes the rigorous-conceptual analysis of Concept of Nature, even as the metaphysical conclusions go beyond analytic limits.
"The rigorous analysis of natural-philosophical concepts." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A retrospective affinity: Whitehead's realism about real natural structures with emergent properties has structural overlap with subsequent critical realism.
"The real layered structure of nature." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A complicated relation: Whitehead draws on the British Hegelian-idealist tradition (Bradley, McTaggart) for the critique of the bifurcation of nature.
"The idealist critique of materialist reduction." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
A retrospective affinity: Whitehead's attention to the practical-scientific success of theories combined with their philosophical interpretation has pragmatic-realist structure.
"Practical-scientific success and philosophical interpretation must both be respected." (Concept of Nature, paraphrasing)
Internal Tensions
The Concept of Nature's critique of the bifurcation of nature has been engaged appreciatively by philosophers (Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers in the recent French process-philosophical revival) and critiqued by strict scientific naturalists. The relation between the 1920 Concept of Nature, the 1922 Principle of Relativity, and the 1929 Process and Reality is itself an interpretive question — is the philosophy of nature smoothly developmental, or are there real shifts in Whitehead's metaphysical project?
I. Time
Process time — the durations of events as the basic temporal reality, against the mathematical instants of classical physics.
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II. Space
Relational extensional space — the relations of extension between events constitute spatial structure.
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III. Matter
Material reality as emergent from events and their qualities; the bifurcation of nature rejected.
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IV. Observer
The perceiving observer as part of nature; the lived perception of nature is itself a natural event.
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V. Energy
Process energy as the dynamic content of events; not separable from the events themselves.
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VI. Information
The structured relations of events preserve the natural information; lived perception discloses qualities that scientific abstraction omits.
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How The Concept of Nature resolves each dilemma
51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 17 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
6 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.
4 mainstream positions
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.