Works › The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke
Work #1482 · Late period

The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke

Stillingfleet's 1697–98 published exchanges with John Locke on substance and ideas

Edward Stillingfleet · 1697 (with subsequent rejoinders through 1698) · English · Published letters / controversial-theological exchange

Tradition: Late-Restoration philosophical theology / Locke controversy

Stillingfleet's 1697–98 replies to Locke — the most extensive philosophical exchange of Locke's life

Stillingfleet's two 'Answers' to Locke (the 1697 'Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's Letter' and the 1698 'Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's Second Letter') form the bishop-side of the Stillingfleet-Locke exchange — the most extensive published philosophical controversy of Locke's life. The exchange opened when Stillingfleet's 1696 'Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity' suggested that Locke's 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding' (1690) — through its account of substance as merely the supposed support of a collection of ideas — could not sustain the orthodox theological language about substance the Trinitarian doctrine requires. Locke replied with his 1697 'Letter to Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester' (Locke had been an admirer and friend of Stillingfleet before this controversy began; the dispute caused real personal distress on both sides). Stillingfleet answered: the 1697 'Bishop of Worcester's Answer' defends his original characterisation of Locke's position and presses the metaphysical-theological consequences. Locke replied again (1698, 'Mr Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer to His Letter'). Stillingfleet answered again (1698, 'The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's Second Letter'). The exchange continued through several more rounds before Stillingfleet's 1699 death effectively ended it. The substantive philosophical issues — the nature of substance, the relations between idea and substance, the cognitive accessibility of substance, the philosophical-theological vocabulary appropriate to Trinitarian doctrine — were among the most important early-modern philosophy-of-language and metaphysical disputes; the exchange shaped both Locke's subsequent revisions of the Essay (the 1700 fourth edition contains substantial changes responding to Stillingfleet) and the broader eighteenth-century philosophical landscape (Berkeley, Hume, and Reid all engage the Locke-Stillingfleet exchange).

Author

Editions cited

  • The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's Letter (Henry Mortlock, London, 1697)
  • The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's Second Letter (Henry Mortlock, London, 1698)
  • In Stillingfleet, Works (London, 1710, 6 vols), vol. 3
  • Locke's side collected in Mr Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer (Awnsham and John Churchill, 1697-99)
  • Critical commentary: M. A. Stewart, 'Stillingfleet and the Way of Ideas' (in his English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, Oxford, 2000); E. J. Lowe, Locke (Routledge, 2005)
Compare this work

School Embodiments

Scholasticism · 28%
Realism · 22%
Anglican Broad-Church · 18%
Rationalism · 12%
Natural Theology · 10%
Christianity (Generic) · 10%
Scholasticism 28%

Defining late-scholastic critique of the new empiricist 'way of ideas'.

"The new way of ideas cannot supply us with the notion of substance which orthodox divinity requires." (Bishop of Worcester's Answer, 1697)
Realism 22%

Defends metaphysical realism about substance against Lockean idea-talk.

"Substance is a real support of accidents — not merely a name for a collection of ideas." (Answer to Locke, 1698)
Anglican Broad-Church 18%

Defends orthodox Trinitarian terminology against empiricist drift.

"The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be reduced to a play of ideas." (Bishop of Worcester's Answer, 1697)
Rationalism 12%

Rational-theological methodology against the empiricist Essay.

"Reason itself requires the notion of substance." (Bishop of Worcester's Answer, 1697)
Natural Theology 10%

Natural-theological background.

"Natural theology rests on the metaphysical notion of substance." (Answer to Locke, 1698)
Christianity (Generic) 10%

Confessional-Christian framework throughout.

"The Christian religion requires a richer metaphysical grammar than empiricism allows." (Bishop of Worcester's Answer, 1697)

Internal Tensions

The most sustained scholastic-realist critique of Lockean empiricism in print; primary source for both sides. Continuously discussed in subsequent Locke-scholarship; the metaphysical issues (substance and accident, the cognitive accessibility of substance, the relations between language and ontology) were among the most important seventeenth-century philosophical questions.

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I. Time

1697-98. Stillingfleet was 62-63; the exchange continued until his 1699 death.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Grain: Continuous Freedom: Both Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One
✦

II. Space

London / Worcester — Stillingfleet's episcopal residence; Oates (Locke's residence with Sir Francis and Lady Masham, in Essex).

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local
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III. Matter

Two large 'Answer' volumes plus subsequent rejoinders (~600 pages total). Form is the characteristic seventeenth-century printed-letter controversy.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local
◎

IV. Observer

Stillingfleet as scholastic-metaphysical critic of Locke's empiricism. The observer is the senior Anglican-theological philosopher engaging the most innovative philosophical work of the post-1690 period.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Knowledge Extent: Immediate Knowledge Retainment: Total Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: Limited
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V. Energy

Sustained controversial-philosophical energies of a four-round exchange. The Locke-Stillingfleet controversy is the most extensive published philosophical exchange of either thinker's life.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible
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VI. Information

Multiple printed letters published as the controversy unfolded. The exchange shaped Locke's 1700 fourth-edition Essay revisions.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Substantival Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Conserved Granularity: Continuous

Personas that cite this work

Edward Stillingfleet John Locke George Berkeley Samuel Clarke

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

100%
Edward Stillingfleet
34/34
100%
Frederick Copleston
34/34
100%
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers
34/34
100%
John Bramhall
34/34
100%
Michael Servetus
34/34
100%
Pelagius
34/34

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

75%
Catholic/Thomistic
24/26
75%
Zoroastrianism
24/26
75%
Jewish Philosophy (Maimonidean)
24/26
75%
Christian Personalism
24/26
75%
Liberation Theology
24/26
75%
Christian Existentialism
24/26
73%
Manichaeism
23/26
70%
Eastern Orthodox Christianity
22/26

How The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke resolves each dilemma

31 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 3 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 26 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon.
On this view, time itself is finite — the universe had a beginning and will have an end. Heat death (or whatever the actual end-state turns out to be) is a real horizon, structurally implied by the kind of cosmos we live in.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) · Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) · Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed. (15%)
Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit.
On this view, the cosmos is bounded in both time and matter; resources are categorically not renewable beyond what cosmic processes provide. Practical limits and metaphysical limits coincide. Living well means living within limits, not engineering around them.
Roads not taken Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) · The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) · Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering. (15%)
Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide?
If we owe future people a habitable planet and the material means to flourish, and the cosmos is bounded in ways that make those obligations impossible at some scale, the obligation and the possibility come apart. Where they come apart turns on what kind of finitude we live in.
The cosmos is bounded; our obligations to future generations are bounded with it.
On this view, the cosmos has limits; the obligation to future people is real but cannot exceed what the limits allow. The categorical worry about owing the impossible doesn't arise: the limits bound the asking. Ethics within a created or bounded order is the only …
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is not; we can owe more across long time than the matter can provide. (47%) · The owing-and-possibility question is level-dependent; we owe what is appropriate at the level we act on. (26%) · Both time and matter are unbounded; we cannot in principle owe more than is possible. (15%)
3 mainstream positions
How much weight do future people deserve? Future people are as real as you are — and their interests count for as much. 47% Is regret rational? The past is as real as the present; regret is a real attitude toward a real thing. 47% Do we owe extinct species something we cannot give them? Extinct species are as real as we are; they have standing. 47%
3 unaligned
Are addicts responsible for their addiction? Schools split: 69% / 10% / 9% — Do you really choose? Schools split: 69% / 10% / 9% — Should we hold AI systems responsible for what they do? Schools split: 69% / 10% / 9% —
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is the world created from nothing? Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. 55% Is the physical world fully real? Yes — the physical world is fully real, mind-independent, persisting. 55% Does matter have intrinsic moral standing? Matter is morally considerable insofar as it is created or conserved good. 55% What is money? Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. 54% What is a nation? A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. 54% What makes someone male or female? Sex is a real biological kind with given content. 54% Should we edit the human germline? Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. 54%
Observer · 37 dilemmas, all mainstream
Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% When does a person begin? A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. 54% What is marriage? Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. 54% What is our place in nature? Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. 48% Should we colonize space? Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. 48% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Genetic modification is cultivation by other means. 48% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Defer to credentialed traditions; experts are the modern analog. 28% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is the paradigm case of authoritative knowledge. 28% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM has no soul to whom revelation could be addressed; the question doesn't apply. 28% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? — — Are the dead morally present to the living? — — Are there indivisible units of experience? — — Can prayer for someone far away affect them? — — Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? — — Could an AI have a mind that matters? — — Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? — — Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? — — Does history have a direction or meaning? — — Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? — — Does prayer change God's mind? — — How is knowledge of reality produced? — — If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? — — Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? — — Is memory stored or reconstructed? — — Is reality fundamentally digital? — — Is salvation, liberation, or fulfillment individual or communal? — — Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? — — Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? — — What happens to "you" when you die? — — What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? — — What makes someone the same person over time? — — Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? — —
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
Is anything truly lost when someone forgets? Information is conserved — the personal pattern is held even when an individual mind loses it. 39% Does deleting your data online destroy something real? Information at the cosmic level isn't destroyed; deletion only obscures access. 39% Could the dead, in principle, be brought back? The information that constitutes a person is conserved; restoration is in principle possible. 39% Is forgiveness ontologically possible? The offense persists ontologically; forgiveness is real moral work, but it doesn't erase what was. 39%
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