On Free Will
De Libertate Arbitrii — Anselm's c. 1080-85 dialogue on freedom of choice as the power to preserve rightness of will for its own sake
Tradition: Medieval Latin theology
Free will as the power to preserve rightness of will for its own sake — Anselm's distinctive medieval definition
De Libertate Arbitrii (On Free Will) is Anselm's c. 1080-85 dialogue defining freedom of choice as "the power to preserve rightness of will for its own sake" (potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem). The work distinguishes freedom from the mere ability to sin (which Anselm argues is not freedom but a defect); free will properly is the capacity to maintain right willing when one could fail to. Foundational medieval text on freedom, will, and moral agency.
Author
Editions cited
- De Libertate Arbitrii (c. 1080-85); Schmitt critical edition; English in Davies-Evans, Anselm: The Major Works (Oxford UP, 1998)
School Embodiments
Foundational medieval text on free will; shaped Aquinas's treatment.
"Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rightness of will for its own sake." (De Libertate Arbitrii, central definition)
Careful philosophical analysis of what freedom is, distinct from popular conception.
"To sin is not free; it is rather slavery. Only the power to preserve right willing is freedom." (De Libertate Arbitrii)
Realist about will, freedom, and moral agency as real features of rational creatures.
"The will is real; its rightness is real; its freedom to preserve rightness is real." (De Libertate Arbitrii)
The framework of freedom-as-preservation-of-rightness has been engaged by liberal-theological accounts of moral autonomy.
"True freedom is not arbitrary choice but the power to be rightly directed." (De Libertate Arbitrii)
Reformation accounts of bondage of will engaged Anselm's framework critically.
"The will's capacity for rightness is itself a gift; without grace it lapses." (De Libertate Arbitrii, in tension with later Reformation reading)
Platonic background — freedom as the proper ordering of soul toward the Good.
"As Plato saw, the truly free soul is the one rightly ordered toward the highest good." (De Libertate Arbitrii)
Internal Tensions
Anselm's definition has been variously assessed — defenders see its distinctive philosophical depth, critics see it as too narrow to cover ordinary uses of "free will."
I. Time
The temporal moral life of the free creature.
Attributes
II. Space
The interior space of the will and its rightness.
Attributes
III. Matter
The embodied rational creature whose will is in question.
Attributes
IV. Observer
The rational moral agent.
Attributes
V. Energy
The energy of the will preserving rightness.
Attributes
VI. Information
The careful definition of freedom; the analysis of will's capacities.
Attributes
Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How On Free Will resolves each dilemma
51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 6 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
6 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.