School #93

Modernism

Late 19th–mid 20th c. (Baudelaire, Joyce, Woolf, Eliot, Kafka, Stravinsky, Picasso, Schoenberg, Le Corbusier).

Modernism is the broad cultural and intellectual movement that responded to the conditions of industrial modernity — the loss of religious cosmology, the velocity of the city, the trauma of the First World War — with formal experiment across the arts and a new self-consciousness about the medium of representation itself. It is characterised by the dignified handling of fragmentation, alienation, and the absence of a shared interpretive framework.

Worldview

Modernists treat the disenchanted, technocratic, fragmented world as the irreducible condition of contemporary life, and treat formal innovation as the available response. Art is not the reflection of a pre-given order but the construction of one within the disorder.

Moral Implications

Moral seriousness is preserved through formal seriousness: the discipline of getting the form right is itself an ethical commitment in a world that has lost its inherited frameworks.

Practical Implications

Modernism shaped the twentieth-century novel, poetry, painting, architecture, and classical music, and supplied the formal vocabulary that the postmodern movements of the later century inherited and contested.

I. Time

Time is registered as it is lived under industrial conditions — accelerated, fragmented, sometimes circular within the day, sometimes spasmodic. The flashback, the simultaneity of perspectives, and the long Joycean day are formal responses.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Grain: Discrete Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Dimensionality: One Direction: Uni-directional

II. Space

Modernist space is the space of the metropolis — Baudelaire's Paris, Joyce's Dublin, Eliot's unreal city — where the crowd, the boulevard, the underground compress radically different lives into shared proximity. It is registered as perspectival, fragmentary, and emergent from the perceiver's movement rather than as the neutral container of classical geometry. Cubist painting and the multi-viewpoint novel make this explicit: a single object is shown from several incompatible sides at once, and the unity of the depicted space is something the viewer assembles rather than receives. The modernist treats spatial coherence as a formal achievement, not a given.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

Matter is emergent: it appears to the modernist not as the solid stuff of Newtonian physics but as something assembled by perception, by the medium of representation, and by industrial process. The found object, the collage, the readymade, and the machine aesthetic in Le Corbusier and the Bauhaus express the conviction that material form is constructed rather than discovered. Behind this stands the cultural memory of new physics, new materials, and the trenches of the First World War — all of which dissolved the inherited sense of stable substance. Modernist art does not deny that there are bodies and things, but it treats their apparent unity as the work of formal organisation.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

The modernist observer is fragmented, urban, self-conscious about her own perception, and aware that the inherited interpretive frameworks no longer compose the world for her. The stream of consciousness is the modernist novel's formal answer.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Extent of Knowledge: Immediate Retainment of Knowledge: Immediate Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None Moral Authority: Constructed Theological Method: N/A

V. Energy

Energy is the felt acceleration of industrial modernity — the speed of the train and the motorcar, the flicker of cinema, the percussive pulse of Stravinsky's 'Rite of Spring', the dynamism the Futurists worshipped and the great modernists handled with more ambivalence. It is registered as both exhilarating and exhausting: the city's energy underwrites Woolf's stream of consciousness and Joyce's epic day, but it also produces the nervous fatigue diagnosed across the period. The modernist does not deny the conservation laws of physics so much as live inside an experiential economy where energy is felt as charge, intensity, and the violent discharge of the war years.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Emergent Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Information is emergent — meaning is constructed in the encounter between the work and the reader, not delivered intact through a transparent medium. The modernist novel disperses narrative across multiple consciousnesses, withholds explanatory framing, and forces the reader to assemble sense from juxtaposition: the technique of 'The Waste Land', of 'Ulysses', of Faulkner's monologues. The shared interpretive framework that an older fiction could presuppose has collapsed, and modernist form registers that collapse rather than papering over it. Truth is no longer reported but enacted in the discipline of getting the form right.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Emergent Cosmic Conservation: Non-conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Discrete
← #92 Christianity (Generic) All Schools #94 Liberalism →

Works that name Modernism in their embodiments

Foundational texts that draw on this school, with each work's declared weight.

30%
The Castle (Late)
Franz Kafka · 1922 (composed); 1926 (posthumous)
30%
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Mid)
James Joyce · 1903-15 (composed); 1914-15 (serialized in The Egoist); 1916 (book)
30%
The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (Early)
Thomas Stearns Eliot · 1910-11 (drafted), 1915 (published)
30%
Wild Grass (Yecao) (Mid)
Lu Xun · 1924-26 prose-poems; 1927 collection
25%
Duino Elegies (Late)
Rainer Maria Rilke · 1912-22 (composed at Duino and Muzot); 1923 (published)
25%
The Old Man and the Sea (Late)
Ernest Hemingway · 1952
25%
Poems (Late)
Gerard Manley Hopkins · 1875-89 (composed); 1918 (posthumous publication ed. Robert Bridges)
25%
Sprachgitter (Mid)
Paul Celan · 1959
25%
Requiem (Late)
Anna Akhmatova · 1935-61 (composed and memorized); 1963 (first published abroad); 1987 (in USSR)
25%
Collected Poems (Late)
W. H. Auden · 1927-73 (composed); 1976 (collected)
25%
The Great Gatsby (Mid)
F. Scott Fitzgerald · 1924-25
25%
Invisible Man (Mid)
Ralph Ellison · 1945-52
25%
Hopscotch (Mid)
Julio Cortázar · 1963 (Spanish Rayuela); 1966 (English)
25%
The Golden Notebook (Mid)
Doris Lessing · 1957-62
25%
Spring Snow (Late)
Yukio Mishima · 1965-67 (serial), 1969 (book)
25%
The Decay of the Angel (Late)
Yukio Mishima · 1970 (completed Nov 25, 1970); 1971 (posthumous publication)
25%
Wandering (Panghuang) (Mid)
Lu Xun · 1926
22%
Chitra (Early-to-middle)
Rabindranath Tagore · 1892 (Bengali); 1913 English version (Macmillan)
20%
Kokoro (Late)
Natsume Sōseki · 1914 (serialized Asahi Shimbun)
20%
North (Mid)
Seamus Heaney · 1975
20%
The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle (Late)
Haruki Murakami · 1994-95 (Japanese 3 vols.); 1997 (English single volume)
20%
Ariel (Late)
Sylvia Plath · 1962-63 (composed); 1965 (posthumous publication ed. Ted Hughes)
20%
Canto General (Mid)
Pablo Neruda · 1938-49 (composed in exile and underground); 1950 (Mexico City and Santiago)
20%
2666 (Late)
Roberto Bolaño · 2001-03 (composed during fatal illness); 2004 (posthumous)
20%
Ash-Wednesday (Mid)
Thomas Stearns Eliot · 1927-1930
20%
Murder in the Cathedral (Mid)
Thomas Stearns Eliot · 1935
20%
The Temple of Dawn (Late)
Yukio Mishima · 1968-70 (serial), 1970 (book)
20%
Call to Arms (Nahan) (Mid)
Lu Xun · 1923
20%
Old Tales Retold (Gushi Xinbian) (Late)
Lu Xun · 1922-35; 1935 collection
20%
The Memorandum (Early)
Václav Havel · 1965
18%
Gora (Middle)
Rabindranath Tagore · 1907-09 serialised; 1910 publication
18%
The Words (Late)
Jean-Paul Sartre · 1963-64 (published 1964)
18%
She Came to Stay (Early)
Simone de Beauvoir · 1937-41 composition; 1943 publication
16%
The Arcades Project (Career-spanning (unfinished))
Walter Benjamin · 1927-1940 (unfinished at Benjamin's 1940 death; published posthumously 1982)
16%
Berlin Childhood Around 1900 (Middle (composed during exile))
Walter Benjamin · 1932-1938 composition; posthumously published 1950
15%
The Cherry Orchard (Late)
Anton Chekhov · 1903 (composed); 1904 (premiered at the Moscow Art Theatre)
15%
Mother Courage and Her Children (Late)
Bertolt Brecht · 1939 (composed in Swedish exile); 1941 (Zurich premiere)
15%
On Photography (Late)
Susan Sontag · 1973-77 (essays in New York Review of Books); 1977 (book)
15%
Their Eyes Were Watching God (Mid)
Zora Neale Hurston · 1937
15%
Midnight's Children (Mid)
Salman Rushdie · 1979-81
15%
My Name Is Red (Mid)
Orhan Pamuk · 1998 (Turkish Benim Adım Kırmızı); 2001 (English)
15%
Gravity's Rainbow (Mid)
Thomas Pynchon · 1968-72
15%
Blood Meridian (Late)
Cormac McCarthy · 1985
15%
Snow Crash (Mid)
Neal Stephenson · 1992
15%
Jazz (Late)
Toni Morrison · 1992
15%
The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea (Mature)
Yukio Mishima · 1963
14%
The First Cities (Early)
Audre Lorde · 1968
14%
Bāng-i-Darā (Early-to-middle)
Muhammad Iqbal · 1924 (poems 1900s-1920s)
12%
Aesthetic Theory (Final)
Theodor Adorno · 1961-1969 (left unfinished at death); 1970 posthumous publication
10%
The Picture of Dorian Gray (Late)
Oscar Wilde · 1890 (Lippincott's); 1891 (revised book)
10%
Things Fall Apart (Mid)
Chinua Achebe · 1958
10%
Disgrace (Late)
J. M. Coetzee · 1999
10%
Moby-Dick (Mid)
Herman Melville · 1850-51
10%
The Handmaid's Tale (Late)
Margaret Atwood · 1985
10%
The Cairo Trilogy (Mid)
Naguib Mahfouz · 1956-57 (Bayn al-Qasrayn, Qasr al-Shawq, al-Sukkariyya)
10%
My Brilliant Friend (Late)
Elena Ferrante · 2011 (Italian L'amica geniale); 2012 (English)
10%
More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction (Mid)
Kodwo Eshun · 1998
10%
Space Is the Place (Mid)
Sun Ra (Herman Poole Blount) · 1972 (filming); 1973 (album); 1974 (film release)
10%
Sun and Steel (Late)
Yukio Mishima · 1968
5%
The Home and the World (Late)
Rabindranath Tagore · 1915-16 (Bengali); 1919 (English by Surendranath Tagore)
5%
The Dispossessed (Late)
Ursula K. Le Guin · 1974
5%
Ways of Seeing (Late)
John Berger · 1972 (BBC series and book)
5%
Camera Lucida (Late)
Roland Barthes · 1979-80 (Barthes died Mar 1980)
5%
Bleak House (Mid)
Charles Dickens · 1852-53 (serialized); 1853 (book)
5%
Wuthering Heights (Mid)
Emily Brontë · 1846-47 (composed); 1847 (published under pseudonym Ellis Bell)
5%
Foundation (Mid)
Isaac Asimov · 1942-50 (stories); 1951 (collected as Foundation)
5%
The Fire Next Time (Mid)
James Baldwin · 1962-63
5%
Kindred (Mid)
Octavia E. Butler · 1979
5%
Hyperobjects (Late)
Timothy Morton · 2013

How Modernism resolves each dilemma

56 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 24 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 1 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon.
On this view, time itself is finite — the universe had a beginning and will have an end. Heat death (or whatever the actual end-state turns out to be) is a real horizon, structurally implied by the kind of cosmos we live in.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) · Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) · Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed. (15%)
Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit.
On this view, the cosmos is bounded in both time and matter; resources are categorically not renewable beyond what cosmic processes provide. Practical limits and metaphysical limits coincide. Living well means living within limits, not engineering around them.
Roads not taken Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) · The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) · Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering. (15%)
Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (24/202)
Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide?
If we owe future people a habitable planet and the material means to flourish, and the cosmos is bounded in ways that make those obligations impossible at some scale, the obligation and the possibility come apart. Where they come apart turns on what kind of finitude we live in.
The cosmos is bounded; our obligations to future generations are bounded with it.
On this view, the cosmos has limits; the obligation to future people is real but cannot exceed what the limits allow. The categorical worry about owing the impossible doesn't arise: the limits bound the asking. Ethics within a created or bounded order is the only …
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is not; we can owe more across long time than the matter can provide. (47%) · The owing-and-possibility question is level-dependent; we owe what is appropriate at the level we act on. (26%) · Both time and matter are unbounded; we cannot in principle owe more than is possible. (15%)
6 mainstream positions

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
“Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal.
On this view, gold, fiat currency, cryptocurrency, frequent-flyer miles, prison cigarettes, and the IOUs scribbled on a bar napkin are not all the same kind of thing. They share family resemblances but no common essence. Trying to define money univocally is asking a question that …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Money is the ledger of obligations among real people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
“Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together.
On this view, what we call nations are large-scale imagined communities — necessarily imagined because their members will never meet most other members, necessarily imagined as bounded and sovereign. The imagination is real and consequential; the underlying kind is not.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
“Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence.
On this view, the everyday categories of male and female pick out overlapping clusters of features — anatomy, physiology, social role, self-understanding, behaviour — that do not reduce to a single essence. The categories are useful but lossy; the demand for a single definition is …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical.
On this view, 'human nature' picks out an overlapping cluster of features — anatomical, developmental, cognitive, social — without a single essence the cluster reduces to. The question of whether germline editing is permissible doesn't turn on transgressing an essence (there isn't one) but on …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric. (15%)
Distinctive · only 23% of schools agree (47/202)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing.
On this view, matter is genuinely there, but it isn't the floor of reality. It depends on something more fundamental — dependent origination, mind, divine sustaining act, computational substrate, or the structure of conditions — and is conserved only at its own level of description. …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (55%) · Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance. (16%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 5% of schools agree (10/202)
What happens to "you" when you die?
Whether anything of you persists — and in what sense — depends on what you take a person to be.
The question presupposes a "you" that never was.
Selfhood was always a useful construction stitched together from experiences, narratives, and habits. "What happens to you?" mis-poses the issue: there was no unified thing to either survive or perish.
Roads not taken A soul continues into another mode of being. (37%) · Death is genuinely the end. (30%) · You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. (18%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there.
There is no point at which an unchanging core "comes into being"; there is a stream of conditioned arising that we choose to mark, or not mark, at various places. The political and moral question of how to treat developing humans is real; the metaphysical …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (16/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
“Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal.
On these views, “marriage” is a name applied to many overlapping but distinct social configurations across cultures and across history. To ask “what is marriage, really?” is to ask a question that doesn’t have a single answer — because there isn’t a single thing whose …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates. (15%)
Distinctive · only 8% of schools agree (17/202)
Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed?
What kind of thing is a true claim, and how does it relate to the standpoint from which it is made?
What counts as truth is constituted by language, practice, history, power.
There is no fact-of-the-matter independent of the constitutive frameworks; truth is constructed.
Roads not taken Truth is mind-independent, universal, accessible in principle to all. (65%) · Truth is real but always known from a perspective. (16%) · Truth is real but accessible only from within a tradition. (10%)
Distinctive · only 13% of schools agree (27/202)
Is reality fundamentally digital?
Pancomputationalism, Planck-scale quanta, simulation theory and Kabbalistic letter-mysticism all say yes — but for very different reasons. The rest of the atlas says no.
Yes — bits, quanta, computational substrate.
On this view, the world is at bottom discrete and law-governed, with no metaphysical agency above or behind the substrate. Reality reduces to bits or their physical analogues; the continuous appearance of fields and flows is coarse-graining over discrete underlying structure.
Roads not taken No — continuous divine sustaining act, the Tao that knows no joints, the One's self-disclosure. (44%) · No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. (37%) · Yes — but divinely-discrete: divine letters, momentary cognitions, atomistic theism. (6%)
31 mainstream positions
Are there indivisible units of experience? Yes — naturalist quanta of experience. 13% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Stored — discrete engrams, traces, weights. 13% What makes someone the same person over time? There was never a fixed self to either preserve or lose. 14% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? There was no fixed person to lose; care is owed to whoever is here. 14% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? There was no fixed you to either survive or fail to; the question is malformed. 14% What is our place in nature? Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world. 15% Should we colonize space? The 'space frontier' is partly what we make of it. 15% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? What counts as a 'natural' genome is itself a construction. 15% Does history have a direction or meaning? History is the gradual unfolding of improvement or liberation. 23% Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. 50% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 49% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 49% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. 46% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditators are bounded observers reporting unusual brain states; the 'timeless' is metaphorical. 46% Does prayer change God's mind? If there is an addressee at all, it is in time; prayer is communication, and may genuinely change what comes next. 46% Are the dead morally present to the living? Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. 44% What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize? The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. 44% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? The discrete person is the moral primary. 40% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the practice, not the practitioner. 14% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. 14% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer. 14% How is knowledge of reality produced? Through careful description of lived experience. 12% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? Talk of 'standing' presupposes fixed selves that animals (and we) don't have. 10% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Asking whether the organoid is 'really' conscious presupposes a category we don't have. 10% Could an AI have a mind that matters? The question presupposes a kind of mind that never existed in the first place. 7%
1 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
Jump to school (202)
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 #128 #129 #130 #131 #132 #133 #134 #135 #136 #137 #138 #139 #140 #141 #142 #143 #144 #145 #146 #147 #148 #149 #150 #151 #152 #153 #154 #155 #156 #157 #158 #159 #160 #161 #162 #163 #164 #165 #166 #167 #168 #169 #170 #171 #172 #173 #174 #175 #176 #177 #178 #179 #180 #181 #182 #183 #184 #185 #186 #187 #188 #189 #190 #191 #192 #193 #194 #195 #196 #197 #198 #199 #200 #201 #202