School #97

Feminism

Modern: late 18th c. (Wollstonecraft); first-wave 19th c.; second-wave 1960s–80s (Beauvoir, Friedan, Millett); third- and fourth-wave (intersectional, transnational) from the 1990s onward.

Feminism is the family of political, ethical, and analytical commitments that take the historical and ongoing subordination of women — and, increasingly, of gender-marginalised persons more broadly — as a fact requiring redress, and that develop the conceptual tools (gender as social construction, the personal as political, intersectional analysis) to diagnose and contest it.

Worldview

Feminists hold that gender, in its received forms, has been a structure of unequal power; that this structure interacts with race, class, sexuality, ability, and other axes of difference; and that the work of philosophy and political life is in part the work of dismantling unjust gender arrangements.

Moral Implications

Moral authority is shifted away from received tradition where that tradition is shown to underwrite injustice. The ethics of care (Gilligan, Noddings, Held), the recovery of feminised epistemic standpoints, and the demand for equal flourishing across genders are characteristic.

Practical Implications

Feminism has reshaped twentieth-century legal, political, literary, philosophical, and social-scientific work, and continues to drive contemporary debates over labour, family, sexual ethics, and political representation. Internal differences (liberal, radical, socialist, eco-, transnational, and intersectional feminisms) are substantial.

I. Time

Feminist analysis treats time as historically structured by gender — the long duration of patriarchy, the periodisations of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-wave organising, the unpaid temporal labour of social reproduction that women have disproportionately borne. The 'double shift', the time-poverty of caregivers, and the gendered rhythms of biological and reproductive life are taken as serious analytical subjects, not background conditions. Recovery work — Gerda Lerner's history of patriarchy, the rediscovery of forgotten women writers and thinkers — treats historical time as a contested archive that must be re-read against the grain. Feminism is constitutively historical in its self-understanding.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Emergent Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Dimensionality: One Direction: Uni-directional

II. Space

Space, for feminist analysis, is gendered: the public-private split, the association of the domestic with the feminine and the political with the masculine, the street as a site of harassment and surveillance, the workplace as a structure of exclusion. Feminist geographers and theorists from Doreen Massey through bell hooks have shown that spatial arrangements — who can go where, who feels safe, whose body belongs in which room — encode and reproduce the structures of power. Space is therefore relational rather than neutral: it is constituted by the social relations that traverse it, and changing those relations changes what the space is.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

The body is the irreducible analytic centre of feminist thought — the menstruating, labouring, pregnant, ageing, gendered, racialised body whose treatment in law, medicine, and labour exposes the abstractions of liberal personhood. Beauvoir's 'The Second Sex', the materialist feminisms of Federici and Delphy, and the contemporary politics of reproductive labour all insist that matter is not a neutral substrate but the site through which gender domination operates. The framework reads this commitment as relational: bodies are constituted in webs of social, economic, and biological relations rather than as self-contained substances.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

Observers are embodied, gendered, plural, and situated within historically specific structures of power. There is no neutral perspective from outside these structures; emancipatory analysis proceeds from inside.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Extent of Knowledge: Mediated Retainment of Knowledge: Partial Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None Moral Authority: Constructed Theological Method: Critical

V. Energy

Energy, in feminist analysis, is the largely invisible labour that sustains everyone else's productive life — the cooking, caring, listening, soothing, cleaning, and managing that has been extracted from women without recognition or wage. The Wages for Housework campaign, Federici's 'Caliban and the Witch', and the contemporary literature on emotional labour all show that the energy budget of social reproduction has been systematically off-loaded onto gendered bodies. Feminism therefore treats energy not as a neutral physical quantity but as a political economy whose distribution is itself a structure of injustice.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Feminist epistemology — Sandra Harding's standpoint theory, Donna Haraway's 'situated knowledges', Patricia Hill Collins's Black feminist epistemology — argues that what counts as knowledge has been shaped by the social position of the knower, and that the supposedly neutral observer of mainstream science is usually a specific (often male, white, propertied) historical figure. Information is therefore treated as constructed within particular power relations rather than as the transparent recording of an independent world. The corrective is not to abandon the pursuit of knowledge but to make its conditions of production visible and to recover the suppressed vantages of those the dominant frameworks have ignored.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Relational Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous
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Works that name Feminism in their embodiments

Foundational texts that draw on this school, with each work's declared weight.

35%
Beyond God the Father (Mid)
Mary Daly · 1973
35%
The Book of the City of Ladies
Christine de Pizan · 1405
30%
The Handmaid's Tale (Late)
Margaret Atwood · 1985
30%
Sexism and God-Talk (Mid)
Rosemary Radford Ruether · 1983
30%
Maria, or The Wrongs of Woman (Late)
Mary Wollstonecraft · 1796-97 (composed, unfinished), 1798 (posthumous publication)
30%
Women and Human Development (Middle-to-late)
Martha Nussbaum · 2000
30%
Webster's First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language (Late-middle)
Mary Daly · 1987 (with Jane Caputi)
30%
Outercourse (Late)
Mary Daly · 1992
28%
The Church and the Second Sex (Early)
Mary Daly · 1968 (rev. 1975)
25%
Their Eyes Were Watching God (Mid)
Zora Neale Hurston · 1937
25%
Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (Late)
Audre Lorde · 1982
25%
A Burst of Light (Late)
Audre Lorde · 1988
25%
Sula (Mid)
Toni Morrison · 1973
25%
Primate Visions (Mid)
Donna Haraway · 1989
25%
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (Mid)
Donna Haraway · 1991
25%
Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™ (Late)
Donna Haraway · 1997
25%
Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (Early)
bell hooks · 1981
25%
The Will to Change (Late)
bell hooks · 2004
25%
Essays on Woman (Mid)
Edith Stein (St. Teresia Benedicta of the Cross) · 1928-1932 (lectures and essays)
25%
The First Cities (Early)
Audre Lorde · 1968
20%
A Doll's House (Mid)
Henrik Ibsen · 1879 (first performed Copenhagen)
20%
My Brilliant Friend (Late)
Elena Ferrante · 2011 (Italian L'amica geniale); 2012 (English)
20%
Ariel (Late)
Sylvia Plath · 1962-63 (composed); 1965 (posthumous publication ed. Ted Hughes)
20%
The Golden Notebook (Mid)
Doris Lessing · 1957-62
20%
The Black Unicorn (Mid)
Audre Lorde · 1978
20%
Coal (Mid)
Audre Lorde · 1976 (drawing on poems from 1968 onward)
20%
The Bluest Eye (Mid)
Toni Morrison · 1970
20%
Letters Written in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (Late)
Mary Wollstonecraft · 1795-96 (composed), 1796 (published)
20%
Original Stories from Real Life (Early)
Mary Wollstonecraft · 1788
20%
Teaching to Transgress (Mid)
bell hooks · 1994
20%
All About Love (Late)
bell hooks · 2000
20%
Wild Seed (Mid)
Octavia E. Butler · 1980
20%
Dawn (Mid)
Octavia E. Butler · 1987
20%
Fledgling (Late)
Octavia E. Butler · 2005
20%
Bloodchild and Other Stories (Mid)
Octavia E. Butler · 1995 (1st ed.), 2005 (2nd ed.)
18%
Not for Profit (Late)
Martha Nussbaum · 2010
16%
She Came to Stay (Early)
Simone de Beauvoir · 1937-41 composition; 1943 publication
15%
Ways of Seeing (Late)
John Berger · 1972 (BBC series and book)
15%
Kindred (Mid)
Octavia E. Butler · 1979
15%
Song of Solomon (Mid)
Toni Morrison · 1977
15%
Jazz (Late)
Toni Morrison · 1992
15%
When Species Meet (Late)
Donna Haraway · 2008
15%
This Is My Story (Mid)
Eleanor Roosevelt · 1937
15%
Chitra (Early-to-middle)
Rabindranath Tagore · 1892 (Bengali); 1913 English version (Macmillan)
15%
Fragments
Sappho · c. 600 BCE
14%
If Beale Street Could Talk (Late)
James Baldwin · 1974
12%
Another Country (Middle)
James Baldwin · 1962
10%
The Home and the World (Late)
Rabindranath Tagore · 1915-16 (Bengali); 1919 (English by Surendranath Tagore)
10%
Black Quantum Futurism: Theory and Practice (Late)
Rasheedah Phillips (ed.) · 2015
10%
You Learn by Living (Late)
Eleanor Roosevelt · 1960
10%
Tomorrow Is Now (Late)
Eleanor Roosevelt · 1962 (written, unfinished at her death), 1963 (published posthumously)
10%
Studies on Hysteria (Early)
Sigmund Freud · 1895
10%
Pyrrhus and Cineas (Early)
Simone de Beauvoir · 1944
10%
Letters (Career-spanning)
Hildegard of Bingen · c. 1146-1179
5%
The Dispossessed (Late)
Ursula K. Le Guin · 1974
5%
On Photography (Late)
Susan Sontag · 1973-77 (essays in New York Review of Books); 1977 (book)
5%
Pride and Prejudice (Mid)
Jane Austen · 1796-97 (drafted as First Impressions); 1813 (published)
5%
Wuthering Heights (Mid)
Emily Brontë · 1846-47 (composed); 1847 (published under pseudonym Ellis Bell)
5%
2666 (Late)
Roberto Bolaño · 2001-03 (composed during fatal illness); 2004 (posthumous)
5%
God-Christ-Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology (Late)
Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki · 1989 (rev. ed.; orig. 1982)
5%
Correspondence with Princess Elisabeth (Late)
René Descartes · 1643-49
5%
On the Problem of Empathy (Early)
Edith Stein (St. Teresia Benedicta of the Cross) · 1917

Personas with Feminism as a declared influence

35%  Christine de Pizan 15%  Sappho

How Feminism resolves each dilemma

56 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 16 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 1 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas, all mainstream

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
Money is the ledger of obligations among real people.
On relational views, money is not a substance you have; it is a record of who owes whom what. Debts and credits are real because the relations they track are real — to kin, to community, to ancestors, to land. Money is the form this …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people.
On relational views, the nation is the relational fabric — extended kinship, ancestral inheritance, shared ecology, communal practice — that hosts a people across generations. Borders matter less than belonging; lineage and land carry the weight that political structures only ratify.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · “Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition.
On relational views, identity is not a property a person has alone; it is constituted by the web of recognition the person sits in. What makes someone a man or a woman in any thick sense is the relations of kinship, community, ritual, and recognition …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · “Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric.
On relational views, what makes someone a person is the web of kinship, ancestry, and community they sit in — not a property the body carries alone. Heritable editing intervenes in exactly this fabric: the lineage that ancestors handed on, the descent that descendants will …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · 'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/202)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance.
On this view, matter is not a stuff but a patterning — the standing relations among things, ancestors, processes, and places. The creatio-ex-nihilo question doesn't quite arise, because the ontology has no slot for a free-standing substance to be created or eternal. What persists is …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (55%) · Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing. (23%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 10% of schools agree (21/202)
What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
Religious traditions differ not only in what they believe, but in how authority is structured — and what counts as the right kind of argument.
Historical-critical method is the authority.
Religious claims are evaluated by the same critical-historical standards as any other claim.
Roads not taken The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. (44%) · Direct experiential union is the authority. (16%) · Institutional teaching tradition is the authority. (14%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation.
On relational views, person was never the name of a thing that exists on its own — it is the name of a node in a web of recognition, obligation, kinship, and ecology. The question of when a being becomes a person is the question …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates.
On relational views, marriage is not a thing in itself but a node in a web — a configuration of obligations to children, extended kin, ancestors, ecology, and community. Its definition is what the network of relations is, and any attempt to specify it apart …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is our place in nature?
Whether humans are masters of nature, members of nature, or makers of nature is not a question climate science can settle. It depends on what nature is, what we are, and what kind of relationship is possible between us.
Embedded in a web — partners with the more-than-human world.
On these views, humans were never outside nature, and the question of our 'place in' it is the question of how to live within the relations that already constitute us. Plants, animals, rivers, ancestors, descendants are not resources or stage scenery; they are kin and …
Roads not taken Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. (48%) · Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world. (15%) · Subject to a real natural order we did not make. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Should we colonize space?
The drive to extend human presence beyond Earth is sometimes framed as the next chapter of stewardship, sometimes as hubris, sometimes as escape from problems we ought to solve here. Which it is depends on what we take our relationship to nature to be.
Colonisation continues the work that ended the wisdom of seven-generation thinking.
On relational views, space colonisation is the abstract endpoint of the same pattern that produced ecological crisis on Earth: humans treating themselves as separate from the more-than-human world they are actually inside. To go to Mars in the spirit of leaving Earth is to leave …
Roads not taken Cultivating worlds beyond Earth is the next form of stewardship. (48%) · The 'space frontier' is partly what we make of it. (15%) · Nature includes its limits; colonisation is bounded by what the cosmos allows. (12%)
31 mainstream positions
Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Editing the genome cuts into the relational fabric; we should be very slow. 15% Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? Truth is real but always known from a perspective. 16% What happens to "you" when you die? You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. 18% Does history have a direction or meaning? History is the gradual unfolding of improvement or liberation. 23% Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. 50% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 49% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 49% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. 46% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditators are bounded observers reporting unusual brain states; the 'timeless' is metaphorical. 46% Does prayer change God's mind? If there is an addressee at all, it is in time; prayer is communication, and may genuinely change what comes next. 46% Are the dead morally present to the living? Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. 44% Is reality fundamentally digital? No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. 37% Are there indivisible units of experience? No — continuous Jamesian stream, phenomenological lived time. 37% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Reconstructed — continuous re-narrating, no fixed engrams. 37% What makes someone the same person over time? You are your body — continuity is bodily continuity. 36% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? Same body, same person — even when the cognitive pattern has changed. 36% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? Different body, different person — you died in the scanner. 36% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? The community of persons is the moral primary. 28% Could an AI have a mind that matters? An AI’s standing is constituted by the relations it enters. 15% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the practice, not the practitioner. 14% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. 14% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer. 14% How is knowledge of reality produced? Through historical-critical engagement and the working-out of contradictions. 13% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? An animal's standing is constituted by its place in the relational fabric. 11% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? The organoid's standing is constituted by the relations of care around its production. 11%
1 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
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