School #110

Postcolonial Theory

From the 1950s–70s anti-colonial intellectuals (Fanon, Memmi, Césaire) and crystallised in late-twentieth-century academic work (Said, *Orientalism* 1978; Bhabha; Spivak; Chakrabarty; Mbembe).

Postcolonial theory is the body of intellectual work that takes the historical and continuing effects of European colonialism on colonised and formerly colonised peoples as a central object of analysis. It investigates how knowledge, language, literature, and institutions were and remain shaped by colonial relations, and develops the conceptual resources (Orientalism, hybridity, the subaltern, provincialising Europe) to expose and contest these effects.

Worldview

Knowledge produced in colonial conditions reflects those conditions; the universal categories of European thought are often regional categories presented as universal; the work of postcolonial critique is to make this visible and to recover marginalised vantages.

Moral Implications

Solidarity with the colonised, refusal of the false universal, and the difficult labour of speaking from and to positions formed by colonial violence are the operative ethical commitments.

Practical Implications

Postcolonial theory has reshaped late-twentieth-century literary studies, anthropology, history, theology, and political theory. It has been critiqued from materialist (Marxist) perspectives for insufficient attention to political economy and from liberal perspectives for excessive scepticism about universalist claims.

I. Time

Time in postcolonial analysis is multiple and contested: the linear progressive time of European modernity has been imposed on populations whose own temporal frames it displaced, and the question of how to think temporality after that imposition is one of the field's central preoccupations. Chakrabarty's call to provincialise Europe is in part a call to provincialise its time, recognising that the now of the metropole is not the now of every people brought into modernity by colonial violence. Mbembe's writing on the postcolony develops a phenomenology of entangled, non-linear postcolonial time. The framework therefore reads time as a politically charged medium rather than a neutral container: histories run on different clocks, and the colonial encounter forced them into contested relations that still shape the present.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Emergent Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Dimensionality: One Direction: Uni-directional

II. Space

Space is structured by colonial cartography — the partitioned territories, the metropole-colony hierarchy, the segregated city of the colonised and the European quarter, the bordered nation-states that decolonisation inherited from imperial administration. Postcolonial theory takes these spatial formations as constitutive of contemporary life rather than as background. Bhabha's third space, Fanon's analysis of the Manichaean colonial city, and Said's imaginative geography of the Orient all show how space is invested with the political work of empire. The framework reads space as relational: its meaning is produced in colonial and postcolonial encounters, and the work of decolonisation includes the imaginative and material reconfiguration of how peoples inhabit and move across territory.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Curvature: Undefined Dimensionality: Three Locality: Non-local

III. Matter

Matter, in the postcolonial frame, is the material substrate of colonial violence and its afterlives: bodies that were trafficked, lands that were appropriated, infrastructures that were built to extract and dispose, monuments that still stand. The tradition treats matter as relational because what counts as a colonised body or an extracted land is constituted in the historical relations of colonial power, not as a brute physical given. Fanon's Wretched of the Earth makes the colonised body the locus of both subjection and revolt; contemporary work on the afterlives of slavery (Saidiya Hartman) and on the materiality of empire (Stoler) develops the analysis. The repatriation debates over museum holdings and the politics of monuments register, in concrete public terms, that material objects carry colonial histories that cannot be neutralised by formal independence.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Non-local

IV. Observer

Observers are situated within historically specific configurations of colonial and post-colonial power. The supposedly universal observer of European philosophy is exposed as a regional figure inflated to universality through colonial conditions.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Extent of Knowledge: Mediated Retainment of Knowledge: Partial Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Plural Metaphysical Agency: None Moral Authority: Constructed Theological Method: Critical

V. Energy

Energy is reframed in postcolonial analysis as one of the contested resources of empire — the coal, oil, plantation labour, and extractive infrastructure that powered European industrial modernity by drawing on colonised lands and bodies. The tradition does not contest the physical sciences' account of energy but exposes how the political economy of energy has been structured by colonial dispossession and continues, in the new shape of climate change and resource extraction, to fall most heavily on the formerly colonised world. Mbembe's writing on necropolitics and the contemporary debates over climate justice and decolonising the green transition are the natural extensions. The framework therefore reads energy as relational in its postcolonial meaning: its political significance is constituted in the unequal relations between metropole and colony rather than as a neutral physical quantity.

Attributes
Extent: Finite Ontological Status: Relational Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

Information is centrally contested in postcolonial analysis: who counts as a knower, whose archives count as evidence, and which languages count as vehicles of serious thought have all been shaped by colonial regimes of knowledge. Said's Orientalism is the foundational study of how Western scholarship constituted its colonised object, and Spivak's Can the Subaltern Speak? asks the harder question of whether the subaltern's information can register at all within the dominant frame. Chakrabarty's project of provincialising Europe extends the analysis to the universal categories of European historiography itself. Information is therefore relational and not conserved across colonial ruptures: archives are partial, languages are lost, oral traditions are suppressed, and the recovery of marginalised knowledges is a political as much as a scholarly task.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Relational Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Non-conserved Granularity: Continuous
← #109 Classical Greek Thought All Schools #111 Cybernetics →

Works that name Postcolonial Theory in their embodiments

Foundational texts that draw on this school, with each work's declared weight.

30%
On the Postcolony (Mid)
Achille Mbembe · 2000 (French), 2001 (English)
30%
Crying in the Wilderness (Mid)
Desmond Tutu · 1982
30%
Hope and Suffering (Mid)
Desmond Tutu · 1983
30%
A Dying Colonialism (Middle (during Algerian war))
Frantz Fanon · 1959
28%
American Power and the New Mandarins (Early (political work))
Noam Chomsky · 1969
25%
Death and the King's Horseman (Mid)
Wole Soyinka · 1975
25%
Myth, Literature and the African World (Mid)
Wole Soyinka · 1976
25%
A Dance of the Forests (Early)
Wole Soyinka · 1960
25%
Kongi's Harvest (Mid)
Wole Soyinka · 1965
25%
The Open Sore of a Continent (Late)
Wole Soyinka · 1996
25%
You Must Set Forth at Dawn (Late)
Wole Soyinka · 2006
25%
Critique of Black Reason (Late)
Achille Mbembe · 2013 (French), 2017 (English)
25%
Necropolitics (Mature)
Achille Mbembe · 2003 (essay), 2016 (book — French), 2019 (book — English)
20%
Brutalism (Late)
Achille Mbembe · 2020 (French), 2024 (English)
20%
The Rainbow People of God (Late)
Desmond Tutu · 1994
20%
Manufacturing Consent (Mid-late (political work))
Noam Chomsky · 1988 (with Edward S. Herman)
18%
Who Owns the Future? (Middle (public-philosophical career))
Jaron Lanier · 2013
15%
Primate Visions (Mid)
Donna Haraway · 1989
15%
Rivonia Trial Statement (Mid)
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela · 1964 (April 20, 1964)
15%
Red Earth, White Lies (Late)
Vine Deloria Jr. · 1995
10%
The Black Unicorn (Mid)
Audre Lorde · 1978
10%
Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (Late)
Audre Lorde · 1982
10%
A Burst of Light (Late)
Audre Lorde · 1988
10%
Letters from Prison (Mid)
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela · 1962-1990
10%
God Is Red (Mid)
Vine Deloria Jr. · 1973 (1st ed.), 1992 (2nd ed.), 2003 (3rd ed.)
10%
Spirit and Reason (Late)
Vine Deloria Jr. · 1999
10%
Evolution, Creationism, and Other Modern Myths (Late)
Vine Deloria Jr. · 2002
10%
The First Man (Final (unfinished))
Albert Camus · c. 1958-1960 (incomplete); 1994 posthumous publication
6%
Decision Points (Late (post-presidency))
George W. Bush · 2010
5%
Bal-i Jibril (Gabriel's Wing) (Late)
Muhammad Iqbal · 1935

How Postcolonial Theory resolves each dilemma

56 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 17 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 1 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas, all mainstream

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
Money is the ledger of obligations among real people.
On relational views, money is not a substance you have; it is a record of who owes whom what. Debts and credits are real because the relations they track are real — to kin, to community, to ancestors, to land. Money is the form this …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Money” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people.
On relational views, the nation is the relational fabric — extended kinship, ancestral inheritance, shared ecology, communal practice — that hosts a people across generations. Borders matter less than belonging; lineage and land carry the weight that political structures only ratify.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · “Nation” names a family of practices imaginatively held together. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition.
On relational views, identity is not a property a person has alone; it is constituted by the web of recognition the person sits in. What makes someone a man or a woman in any thick sense is the relations of kinship, community, ritual, and recognition …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · “Male” and “female” are family-resemblance terms — no single essence. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric.
On relational views, what makes someone a person is the web of kinship, ancestry, and community they sit in — not a property the body carries alone. Heritable editing intervenes in exactly this fabric: the lineage that ancestors handed on, the descent that descendants will …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · 'Human nature' is a cluster term without a single essence; the editing question is empirical, not metaphysical. (8%)
Distinctive · only 16% of schools agree (33/202)
Is the world created from nothing?
Creatio ex nihilo is one of the most distinctive Western-theological claims. Whether matter was created from nothing, eternally exists, or is sustained moment-by-moment turns on what kind of thing matter is.
Matter is constituted by relations; the question of 'from what?' presupposes substance.
On this view, matter is not a stuff but a patterning — the standing relations among things, ancestors, processes, and places. The creatio-ex-nihilo question doesn't quite arise, because the ontology has no slot for a free-standing substance to be created or eternal. What persists is …
Roads not taken Yes — matter was created and is conserved as a real substance. (55%) · Matter is real but emerges from something deeper — neither bedrock nor created-from-nothing. (23%) · Matter arises and dissolves through cosmic rounds; neither created from nothing nor eternal. (4%)
2 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 10% of schools agree (21/202)
What kind of religious-theological authority does the tradition recognize?
Religious traditions differ not only in what they believe, but in how authority is structured — and what counts as the right kind of argument.
Historical-critical method is the authority.
Religious claims are evaluated by the same critical-historical standards as any other claim.
Roads not taken The category does not apply — the school is non-religious. (44%) · Direct experiential union is the authority. (16%) · Institutional teaching tradition is the authority. (14%)
Distinctive · only 12% of schools agree (25/202)
Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally?
Carbon emissions in your country contribute to flooding in another. A factory's effluent across the border kills ecosystems you'll never see. Whether you bear moral weight for what happens far away turns on whether distance dilutes obligation.
Distance doesn't dilute obligation; what is real is the connection, not its length.
On this view, the obligations one bears extend across distance because the connections do. Carbon emissions, trade flows, the global supply chains we are part of, the ancestral and ecological webs that hold the planet together — these constitute real connections that distance does not …
Roads not taken Moral obligation tracks the relations one is in; distance does matter, structurally. (50%) · Distance doesn't dilute obligation; communion of saints / divine relation spans the cosmos. (29%) · Harm anywhere is harm to the One; the boundary that would have insulated you was never real. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation.
On relational views, person was never the name of a thing that exists on its own — it is the name of a node in a web of recognition, obligation, kinship, and ecology. The question of when a being becomes a person is the question …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · The question presupposes a fact of the matter that isn’t there. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates.
On relational views, marriage is not a thing in itself but a node in a web — a configuration of obligations to children, extended kin, ancestors, ecology, and community. Its definition is what the network of relations is, and any attempt to specify it apart …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · “Marriage” names a family of practices — the definition question is nominal. (8%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (30/202)
What is our place in nature?
Whether humans are masters of nature, members of nature, or makers of nature is not a question climate science can settle. It depends on what nature is, what we are, and what kind of relationship is possible between us.
Embedded in a web — partners with the more-than-human world.
On these views, humans were never outside nature, and the question of our 'place in' it is the question of how to live within the relations that already constitute us. Plants, animals, rivers, ancestors, descendants are not resources or stage scenery; they are kin and …
Roads not taken Active in a real nature — we cultivate, steward, transform. (48%) · Nature is partly what we make of it — concepts, practices, and minds shape the world. (15%) · Subject to a real natural order we did not make. (12%)
31 mainstream positions
Should we colonize space? Colonisation continues the work that ended the wisdom of seven-generation thinking. 15% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? Editing the genome cuts into the relational fabric; we should be very slow. 15% Is truth universal, tradition-bound, situated, or constructed? Truth is real but always known from a perspective. 16% What happens to "you" when you die? You were always a pattern. The pattern propagates. 18% Does history have a direction or meaning? History is the gradual unfolding of improvement or liberation. 23% Could causation work backwards? Causation runs one way — the arrow of time is real and structural. 68% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? The asymmetry is real because time itself has a real direction. 68% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? The arrow is real and structural; the asymmetry isn't an artifact of description. 68% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? Damage is real and permanent on the relevant timescales. There is no recovery; there is only limitation. 66% Can a civilization recover from collapse? Civilizational complexity is hard to build and easy to lose; recovery is at best partial. 66% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? Entropy is what time is. The moral weight, if any, is the weight of working against the current. 66% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? Prayer changes the pray-er, not the prayed-for. 49% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is exactly what the math says it is. The pattern is in the noticer. 49% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? The observer is in time; foreknowledge across times raises real freedom problems. 46% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? Meditators are bounded observers reporting unusual brain states; the 'timeless' is metaphorical. 46% Does prayer change God's mind? If there is an addressee at all, it is in time; prayer is communication, and may genuinely change what comes next. 46% Are the dead morally present to the living? Observers are bounded by their own moment, and no further agency makes the dead present. 44% Is reality fundamentally digital? No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. 37% Are there indivisible units of experience? No — continuous Jamesian stream, phenomenological lived time. 37% Is memory stored or reconstructed? Reconstructed — continuous re-narrating, no fixed engrams. 37% What makes someone the same person over time? You are your body — continuity is bodily continuity. 36% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? Same body, same person — even when the cognitive pattern has changed. 36% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? Different body, different person — you died in the scanner. 36% Who is the moral primary — the individual, the community, the cosmos, the class, or the species? The community of persons is the moral primary. 28% Could an AI have a mind that matters? An AI’s standing is constituted by the relations it enters. 15% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust the practice, not the practitioner. 14% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? 'Revelation' is a category communities construct for what counts as authoritative. 14% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? Whether an LLM 'knows' is the constructive question the practice has to answer. 14% How is knowledge of reality produced? Through historical-critical engagement and the working-out of contradictions. 13% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? An animal's standing is constituted by its place in the relational fabric. 11% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? The organoid's standing is constituted by the relations of care around its production. 11%
1 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
Jump to school (202)
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 #128 #129 #130 #131 #132 #133 #134 #135 #136 #137 #138 #139 #140 #141 #142 #143 #144 #145 #146 #147 #148 #149 #150 #151 #152 #153 #154 #155 #156 #157 #158 #159 #160 #161 #162 #163 #164 #165 #166 #167 #168 #169 #170 #171 #172 #173 #174 #175 #176 #177 #178 #179 #180 #181 #182 #183 #184 #185 #186 #187 #188 #189 #190 #191 #192 #193 #194 #195 #196 #197 #198 #199 #200 #201 #202