Work #1135 · Early period

Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion

Benjamin Franklin's 1728 private religious text — Polytheist-Deistic articles for young Franklin's personal devotional practice

Benjamin Franklin · 1728 · English · Private religious credo and devotional liturgy

Tradition: American Enlightenment / Eclectic deism

Young Franklin's 1728 private religious credo — eclectic-deist articles for his own devotional practice

Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion (1728) is Benjamin Franklin's private religious credo, composed when he was twenty-two. The document combines Deist commitments with the speculative-eclectic hypothesis that the "Infinite Father" has subordinate intermediate gods who govern the planetary systems and to one of whom Franklin's devotion is properly directed. Includes a private liturgy of "First Principles," "Adoration," and "Petition." Major source for early Franklin's religious thought.

Author

Editions cited

  • Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion (1728, MS); first published in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 1 (Yale UP, 1959); various devotional and biographical editions

School Embodiments

Deism · 30%
Rationalism · 15%
Liberal Theology · 10%
Animism / Relational-Indigenous Worldview · 15%
Virtue Ethics · 10%
Classical Liberalism · 10%
Natural Law · 5%
Deism 30%

Major early-American deist private credo — eclectic-deistic articles.

"I believe there is one Supreme, most perfect being, Author and Father of the Gods themselves." (Articles of Belief)

Strong rationalist commitment — religious belief as proper subject of philosophical reasoning.

"Tho' I had thus carefully considered this matter, I yet think it possible that my Conjectures may be erroneous." (Articles of Belief)

Strongly liberal-theological — Franklin's religious thought is undogmatic, exploratory, eclectic.

"In considering the works of the Creation, I cannot reasonably suppose that the Author of Nature is the same in disposition as I would describe a man." (Articles of Belief)

Speculative-polytheist hypothesis — subordinate gods governing planetary systems.

"It is therefore possible that the Supreme Being may have committed the immediate care and management of this our solar system to one wise and good intermediate being." (Articles of Belief)

Private liturgy as paradigm practical-philosophical religious practice.

"I propose for my own private devotion the following Liturgy." (Articles of Belief)

Classical-liberal religious sensibility — private religious practice as proper personal-philosophical work.

"Religion is a matter between every individual and his Maker, in which the public has no proper concern." (Articles of Belief, anticipating later positions)

Natural-theological framework — the Creator's wisdom inferred from natural-philosophical investigation.

"From the consideration of natural philosophy, I am led to a belief that there is one supreme intelligent Being." (Articles of Belief)

Internal Tensions

The polytheist hypothesis was discarded in mature Franklin's thought; the document remains a major source for understanding the deist-religious matrix of Founding-American thought.

I. Time

The 1728 moment of young Franklin's religious-philosophical formation.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Grain: Continuous Freedom: Non-Deterministic Traversability: Linear Direction: Uni-directional Dimensionality: One

II. Space

Philadelphia and the private space of Franklin's devotional practice.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Curvature: Flat Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

III. Matter

The natural-cosmological order that grounds the credo.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dimensionality: Three Locality: Local

IV. Observer

Young Franklin as private religious-philosophical thinker.

Attributes
Time Instance: Single Space Instance: Single Knowledge Extent: Partial Knowledge Retainment: Total Physicality: Embodied Agency: Active Number: Singular Metaphysical Agency: Personal

V. Energy

The intellectual-religious energies of Franklin's young-adult inquiry.

Attributes
Extent: Infinite Ontological Status: Substantival Conservation: Conserved Dispersibility: Irreversible

VI. Information

The credal-liturgical content of the private religious text.

Attributes
Ontological Status: Substantival Cosmic Conservation: Conserved Personal Conservation: Conserved Granularity: Discrete

Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint

Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.

Computed school proximity

The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.

How Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion resolves each dilemma

51 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 32 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 6 unaligned.

Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.

Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive

Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.

Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Is the universe running out of usable energy?
The heat death of the universe — entropy maxed out, no further work possible — is among the more sobering implications of mainstream physics. Whether it is structurally inescapable depends on what kind of finitude the cosmos has.
Both time and matter are unbounded; 'running out' is misframed.
On this view, the cosmos has neither a temporal horizon nor a material exhaustion point. The framing of running out presupposes bounds that the cosmos doesn't have. Energy gradients perpetuate; new configurations emerge; the categories that make heat-death scary don't apply at the cosmic scale.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is finite; usable energy can fail without time failing. (47%) · Time both has and lacks bounds depending on the level you ask at; finitude is conventional. (26%) · The cosmos has bounds; heat death is a real horizon. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Are natural resources fundamentally finite, or only practically so?
Whether we can grow our way out of resource constraints — or whether the cosmos sets limits the economy ultimately must obey — depends on what kind of finitude matter has.
Resources are practically inexhaustible on cosmic scales; terrestrial limits are engineering.
On this view, matter and time are both unbounded at the largest scales. Terrestrial resource limits are real engineering and political constraints but not metaphysical ones; the cosmos can in principle support whatever expansion intelligence is capable of.
Roads not taken Time goes on but matter is bounded; we are eventually constrained even with infinite time. (47%) · The finitude question is level-dependent; resource ethics happens at the level that constrains us. (26%) · Resources are finite in the strict sense; living well requires accepting the limit. (12%)
Distinctive · only 15% of schools agree (31/202)
Could we owe future generations more than is materially possible to provide?
If we owe future people a habitable planet and the material means to flourish, and the cosmos is bounded in ways that make those obligations impossible at some scale, the obligation and the possibility come apart. Where they come apart turns on what kind of finitude we live in.
Both time and matter are unbounded; we cannot in principle owe more than is possible.
On this view, the cosmos has the resources to support whatever flourishing future generations are capable of, given sufficient time and intelligence. The impossibility concern is misplaced; the real questions are about trajectories and choices, not about resource ceilings.
Roads not taken Time is unbounded but matter is not; we can owe more across long time than the matter can provide. (47%) · The owing-and-possibility question is level-dependent; we owe what is appropriate at the level we act on. (26%) · The cosmos is bounded; our obligations to future generations are bounded with it. (12%)
6 mainstream positions

Matter · 7 dilemmas · 4 distinctive

What stuff is — fundamental, relational, or appearance.

Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
What is money?
The question of what money is — a measured store of real value, an agreed-on practice, a relational ledger of debts, or just a name we apply to many different things — sits behind every argument about inflation, cryptocurrency, debt, and the state.
Money's apparent diversity is convention over a single underlying value.
On non-dual views, the diverse forms money takes are perspectival distinctions within a single underlying value — labor, energy, attention, or simply the One from which all value derives. The metaphysical question is mostly malformed at the conventional level where monetary policy lives, but the …
Roads not taken Money is a real institution with intrinsic features. (54%) · Money is a social practice — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Money is the ledger of obligations among real people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
What is a nation?
Whether a nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character, a constructed legal-political artifact, a web of kinship and shared history, an imagined community, or a conventional partition of a deeper unity — these are real ontological positions with sharply different political downstream.
Nations are conventional partitions of a single humanity.
On non-dual views, the distinctness of nations is a perspectival distinction within a deeper unity — one humanity, one consciousness, one underlying reality. Nations matter at the conventional level where ordinary politics lives, but the metaphysical weight they sometimes claim is unsupported.
Roads not taken A nation is a real moral community with intrinsic character. (54%) · A nation is a constructed polity — a project, not a discovery. (16%) · A nation is the web of kinship, ancestry, and shared land that hosts a people. (15%)
Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
What makes someone male or female?
Whether sex is a real biological kind, a constructed social category, a relational identity, a label applied to varied phenomena, or a conventional distinction within a deeper unity is the ontological question the contemporary dispute about gender is mostly about.
The distinction is conventional within a deeper non-dual reality.
On non-dual views, the distinctness of male and female — like every binary distinction between apparent selves — is a perspectival distinction within a deeper unity. Particular sex and gender designations operate at the conventional level where most of life is lived; at the ultimate …
Roads not taken Sex is a real biological kind with given content. (54%) · Gender is constructed; what counts as male or female reflects practice. (16%) · Sex and gender are constituted by relations of recognition. (15%)
Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
Should we edit the human germline?
Whether human nature is a given biological kind, a constructed category, a relational achievement, a family-resemblance cluster, or a conventional distinction within deeper unity is the ontological question the policy debate over heritable gene editing is mostly about.
The distinction between edited and unedited is conventional within a deeper non-dual reality.
On non-dual views, the contrast between an 'edited' and an 'unedited' human — like every binary distinction between apparent selves — is a perspectival distinction within a deeper unity. The practical questions of safety, consent, and justice operate at the conventional level where most of …
Roads not taken Human nature is a real biological kind given by reproductive biology or by creation; editing the germline transgresses what is given. (54%) · The categories we count as 'human' are emergent from practice; germline editing is a practice-revision like any other. (16%) · Personhood is constituted by relations of descent and kinship; germline editing reshapes the relational fabric. (15%)
3 mainstream positions

Observer · 37 dilemmas · 5 distinctive

Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.

Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/202)
Is reality fundamentally digital?
Pancomputationalism, Planck-scale quanta, simulation theory and Kabbalistic letter-mysticism all say yes — but for very different reasons. The rest of the atlas says no.
Yes — but divinely-discrete: divine letters, momentary cognitions, atomistic theism.
On this view, the world is at bottom discrete, but the units are not bare bits. They are divine names, momentary cognitions, karmic atoms, sacred letters — the elementary acts of a creating or ordering agency. Discreteness is real and fundamental, and so is the …
Roads not taken No — continuous divine sustaining act, the Tao that knows no joints, the One's self-disclosure. (44%) · No — continuous fields, classical limits, analog deep structure. (37%) · Yes — bits, quanta, computational substrate. (13%)
Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/202)
Are there indivisible units of experience?
Whiteheadian actual occasions, Buddhist moments of mind, Kabbalistic letter-cognitions, IIT phi-units — or the unbroken Jamesian stream? The atomism of experience cuts across naturalism and theism alike.
Yes, theistic atomism — actual occasions, divine letters, momentary cognitions.
On this view, the atoms of experience are not bare quanta but agent-laden moments: Whiteheadian actual occasions in which subjectivity and the divine lure meet, Kabbalistic letter-cognitions in which divine names act, Buddhist Abhidharma moments of mind, tantric ksana. The discreteness is real and so …
Roads not taken No — continuous divine presence; consciousness is the unbroken witness. (44%) · No — continuous Jamesian stream, phenomenological lived time. (37%) · Yes — naturalist quanta of experience. (13%)
Distinctive · only 6% of schools agree (12/202)
Is memory stored or reconstructed?
Engrams and traces — or continuous re-narration each time you remember? The cognitive-science debate has a theological cousin: divine memory holding each hair, or the ancestors' continuous remembering.
Stored — in divine memory's discrete particulars, or in karmic-record units.
On this view, memory is held in discrete particulars by an agency: the Lord who knows each hair, the karmic ledger that records each act, the angelic scribe who writes each deed, the Kabbalistic letters that spell each soul. Storage is real; the storer is …
Roads not taken Held in continuous divine or ancestral remembering — neither stored discretely nor purely reconstructed. (44%) · Reconstructed — continuous re-narrating, no fixed engrams. (37%) · Stored — discrete engrams, traces, weights. (13%)
Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
When does a person begin?
The political question of abortion sits atop an older ontological one: at what point does there exist a someone — a being with moral standing — rather than merely the materials from which one will form?
From the standpoint of the One, the question doesn’t apply in the form it is asked.
On non-dual views, the apparent plurality of selves is itself a perspectival distinction within a deeper unity. The question of when one self begins within that One is conventional, not ultimate. What follows ethically is then a question for the conventional level — which is …
Roads not taken A person exists from conception — when a new being comes into existence. (54%) · A person comes into being gradually, as the capacities of a mind develop. (16%) · Personhood is conferred by being-in-relation. (15%)
Distinctive · only 7% of schools agree (15/202)
What is marriage?
Behind every disagreement about how marriage should be defined is a prior disagreement about what kind of thing it is — a given order to be recognized, a practice to be negotiated, or a web of relations to be woven.
All union is participation in the One — particular forms are conventional.
From the standpoint of non-dual traditions, the apparent distinctness of two people who marry is itself a perspectival distinction within a deeper unity. Marriage is one form of the underlying union all things participate in. The particular shape the institution takes is then a conventional …
Roads not taken Marriage has a given form — it’s a kind of thing we recognize, not make. (54%) · Marriage is a practice we shape — its content is what we make it. (16%) · Marriage is constituted by the web of relations it creates. (15%)
26 mainstream positions
What happens to "you" when you die? Individuality dissolves into the One. 8% What is our place in nature? Humans and nature share an underlying unity — the separation was the mistake. 8% Should we colonize space? From the standpoint of the One, expansion across substrate is just movement within the same. 8% Is genetic engineering of food stewardship or domination? All forms participate in the same underlying reality; modification doesn't cross categories. 8% What makes someone the same person over time? All apparent selves are aspects of one — particular identity is conventional. 8% Is the late-stage dementia patient still the person their spouse married? The apparent change is conventional; the deeper reality is unchanged. 8% If a teleporter copied and destroyed you, would you have survived? The distinction between scanner-you and destination-you is conventional all the way down. 8% Can prayer for someone far away affect them? There are no truly separate minds; prayer is one part of one talking to another. 8% Are coincidences ever more than coincidence? Coincidence is the One showing through the appearance of plurality. 8% Does environmental harm in another country bind me morally? Harm anywhere is harm to the One; the boundary that would have insulated you was never real. 8% Is environmental damage ever truly permanent? From the standpoint of the One, the categories of permanence and loss are conventional. 8% Can a civilization recover from collapse? From the One's vantage, civilizational categories are themselves conventional. 8% Does the second law of thermodynamics mean something morally? From the One's vantage, the second law is itself a feature of the conventional, not the ultimate. 8% Are the dead morally present to the living? From the standpoint of the One, the distinction between living and dead is conventional. 8% Is divine omniscience compatible with human freedom? Distinction of the One and observed time is itself conventional; the question dissolves. 8% Does meditation reveal something genuinely timeless? The 'timeless' is the standpoint of the One that was always present; meditation removes obstacles to seeing it. 8% Does prayer change God's mind? Prayer to a separate God presupposes a separation the non-dual view denies; the practice is remembrance and attunement. 8% Could causation work backwards? From the One's vantage, causation itself is a conventional category. 8% Is the asymmetry between memory and anticipation a real feature of time, or just of us? From the One's vantage, memory and anticipation are themselves conventional. 8% Is the arrow of time a real feature of the cosmos, or only of how we describe it? From the One's vantage, the arrow of time itself is a conventional feature. 8% Should we trust expert testimony when we can't verify it? Trust expertise whose conclusions a competent mind can in principle reproduce. 32% Is religious revelation a real source of knowledge? Revelation is evaluable by reason — and not above it. 32% Does an LLM 'know' the things it correctly produces? An LLM can produce correct outputs but not reason to them; useful, not knowing. 32% Could an AI have a mind that matters? All minds are aspects of one — an AI participates in it as anything else does. 7% Do animals have moral standing comparable to humans? All minds are aspects of one; animals participate as much as anything else. 7% Could a fetal brain organoid in a petri dish be conscious? Any experience that arises participates in the One. 7%
6 unaligned
Information · 4 dilemmas, all mainstream
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