Choices, Values, and Frames
Kahneman and Tversky's 2000 edited volume — prospect theory and its applications
Tradition: Behavioural economics
Kahneman and Tversky's 2000 collection — prospect theory and its extensions across two decades
Choices, Values, and Frames (2000), edited by Kahneman and Tversky, collects the papers extending their 1979 prospect theory — the alternative to expected-utility theory that earned Kahneman the Nobel. The volume includes the original 1979 prospect theory paper, the 1992 cumulative prospect theory, and applications to framing effects, mental accounting, the endowment effect, loss aversion, and reference-dependent preferences across two decades of behavioural-economics research.
Author
Editions cited
- Choices, Values, and Frames, eds. Kahneman, Tversky (Cambridge UP / Russell Sage, 2000)
School Embodiments
Definitive volume of the prospect-theory tradition — the empirical alternative to expected-utility theory that founded behavioural economics.
"The carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference point, not final states of wealth — that is the central insight." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Cognitive-psychological foundation — value functions and decision weights as features of cognitive systems.
"Loss aversion is approximately twice as steep as gain attraction — a robust empirical regularity." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Engages philosophical questions about rationality and the normative status of expected-utility theory.
"Expected utility is a normative ideal that human choice does not approximate — neither does it follow that it should not." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Naturalises decision-making — values as cognitive features rather than abstract preferences.
"Preferences are constructed, not discovered, in the act of choice." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Subsequent evolutionary-psychological treatment of loss aversion as ecological adaptation.
"Loss aversion likely reflects the evolutionary asymmetry between threats and opportunities." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Realist about the cognitive structures — prospect-theoretical value functions are not formal artefacts.
"The value function is a real feature of how human minds evaluate outcomes." (Choices, Values, and Frames)
Internal Tensions
Prospect theory has been variously assessed — within behavioural economics it is canonical; expected-utility theorists continue to defend the classical model as normative.
I. Time
The 1979-2000 research arc — two decades of prospect-theory development.
Attributes
II. Space
The laboratory and the broader decision-environments tested.
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III. Matter
The embodied decision-making humans whose value functions are characterised.
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IV. Observer
The choice-making subject as proper topic of behavioural-economic research.
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V. Energy
The cognitive energies of effortful evaluation under risk.
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VI. Information
The probabilistic decision-information that subjects evaluate.
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Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How Choices, Values, and Frames resolves each dilemma
44 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 9 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 13 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 5 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
4 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.