Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth
Richard Rorty's 1991 Philosophical Papers volume 1 — collected essays on epistemology, science, solidarity
Tradition: Neo-pragmatism
Rorty's 1991 collected essays — solidarity displaces objectivity as the proper epistemic norm
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991) is the first volume of Rorty's Philosophical Papers, collecting his essays from the 1980s. Central pieces — "Solidarity or Objectivity?", "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth", "Science as Solidarity", "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation" — develop the post-representationalist position: knowledge is not mirror-correspondence but ethnocentric agreement; objectivity reduces to inter-subjective solidarity; truth is what our peers will let us get away with saying.
Author
Editions cited
- Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge UP, 1991)
School Embodiments
Major late-twentieth-century pragmatist statement — solidarity over objectivity, conversation over correspondence.
"There is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from the descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society uses in one or another area of inquiry." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Sustained engagement with — and critique of — analytic-metaphysical epistemology.
"The Davidsonian critique of the scheme-content distinction is the death-knell of representationalist epistemology." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Historicist framework — Rorty's "ethnocentric" position depends on the contingency of cultural vocabularies.
"We have to start from where we are; ethnocentrism is not a methodological failing but the human condition." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Develops the liberal-democratic political consequences — solidarity as the proper civic norm.
"The liberal hope is the hope that solidarity will increase — that the circle of 'we' will widen." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Naturalist stance — science as one form of inquiry, not the privileged route to truth.
"Science is not the discovery of the way the world really is; it is one form of inquiry among others." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Continued sympathy with continental anti-foundationalism (Derrida, Foucault).
"Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence and the pragmatist critique of representationalism converge." (Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth)
Internal Tensions
The position has been variously assessed — defenders read it as proper post-foundationalism, critics (Putnam, McDowell, Habermas) see it as conflating truth and warranted assertibility.
I. Time
The 1980s essays — post-positivist turn in American philosophy.
Attributes
II. Space
American academic philosophy and the trans-Atlantic conversation.
Attributes
III. Matter
The natural-scientific world treated naturalistically.
Attributes
IV. Observer
The community of inquirers as collective epistemic subject.
Attributes
V. Energy
The intellectual energies of the post-foundationalist moment.
Attributes
VI. Information
The conversational content of inquiry.
Attributes
Personas with the nearest attribute fingerprint
Historical figures whose own classification on the same six-dimensional grid lands closest to this work's. Computed by attribute-agreement on coordinates both address.
Computed school proximity
The work's attribute fingerprint scored against all schools using the same quiz scorer. Useful as a sanity check on the hand-curated embodiments above.
How Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth resolves each dilemma
41 resolved positions across 4 dimensions, including 6 distinctive where the majority of schools go the other way · 16 unaligned.
Each dimension is sorted so minority positions come first. Mainstream positions are folded into an expandable list.
Time · 9 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Persistence, the future, and the direction of becoming.
6 mainstream positions
Matter · 7 dilemmas, all mainstream
Observer · 37 dilemmas · 3 distinctive
Mind, agency, and the knower's relation to the known.