Experiment #68 · Thought experiment

Dennett's 'Where Am I?'

Brain in Houston, body in a missile silo, point of view…?

Daniel Dennett · 1978 · Personal identity, philosophy of mind

First published: D. Dennett, "Where Am I?" in *Brainstorms* (1978).

Dennett's brain is removed and kept in a vat in Houston; his body is sent to defuse a warhead in Tulsa. Where, then, is Dennett?

Dennett describes a (semi-)fictional scenario in which his brain is removed, kept alive in Houston, and connected by radio to his body operating in Tulsa. From whose perspective is "here"? When the radio link briefly fails, his body collapses but the brain is fine — is *he* now in Tulsa, in Houston, or nowhere? The case dramatises the difficulty of locating the self once mind, body, and point-of-view come apart. Dennett's eventual conclusion (elaborated in *Consciousness Explained*): there is no single Cartesian Theater — the self is a "centre of narrative gravity," not a thing in a place.

Formulation

Brain (in vat, Houston) ↔ radio ↔ body (Tulsa). Three candidates for "where Dennett is": where the brain is, where the body is, where the point of view appears to be. A backup duplicate brain complicates matters further.

Compare this experiment

Dimensions Engaged

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Observer

Targets Observer · Space Instance and Number: the self's spatial location and unity become indeterminate when mind, body, and viewpoint dissociate.

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Space

Bears on Space · Locality at the personal level: where the self *is* may not be a question with a single right answer.

Responses — How Schools Engage

Affirms / takes the bait 1

Buddhism

The case nicely confirms anatta: the "self" is a fiction projected onto changing aggregates, with no fact of the matter about its location.

Reframes the question 4

Naturalism

Dennett's own conclusion: the self is a useful abstraction, a centre of narrative gravity. The "where am I" question is over-extended folk psychology.

Dualism

The non-physical self is wherever the unified point of view is — typically tracking the brain, but in principle separable. The thought experiment is congenial; the materialist conclusion is not forced.

Phenomenology

The experiment misdescribes the structure of selfhood: embodiment and viewpoint are not free parameters that can be set independently. The scenario's coherence is doubtful.

Process Philosophy

The self is a process, not a substance with a location; the puzzle dissolves once one drops the framing of selfhood as residence in a place.

Holds it inconclusive 1

Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism

The case puts pressure on theories of personal identity: psychological-continuity views locate Dennett with the brain; bodily-continuity views with the body; each option has uncomfortable consequences.