Experiment #109 · Thought experiment

Locke's Prince and the Cobbler

Identity follows consciousness, not body

John Locke · 1694 · Personal identity

First published: J. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2nd ed. (1694), II.27.

The consciousness of a prince enters the body of a cobbler. The prince persists — wherever the consciousness goes.

Locke argues that personal identity follows consciousness (specifically, memory-continuity), not bodily continuity. If the consciousness of a prince — including all memories of past actions — were to be transplanted into the body of a cobbler, the resulting person would be the prince, accountable for the prince's actions, and not the cobbler. The case launches the modern psychological-continuity tradition (Locke → Reid → Parfit) and stands in tension with bodily-criterion (animalist) and substantial-form (hylomorphist) accounts. Williams' modern brain-swap variants sharpen the puzzle.

Formulation

Prince P (memories M_P, body B_P) and cobbler C (M_C, B_C). Transfer M_P into B_C. The resulting person has M_P + B_C. Locke: this person is the prince, accountable for prince's actions. Identity follows consciousness/memory.

Compare this experiment

Dimensions Engaged

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Observer

Observer · Number and Physicality: is the person fixed by psychology, body, or some combination?

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Matter

Bears on Matter · Ontological Status: persons are not identical with bodies if Locke is right.

Responses — How Schools Engage

Affirms / takes the bait 2

Analytic Metaphysics / Logical Atomism

A founding text of psychological-continuity theory; modern descendants (Parfit, Shoemaker) refine the criterion but preserve the Lockean core.

Dualism

A natural ally: the mind/soul is the bearer of identity, and the body is the contingent vessel. Locke's argument is congenial to Cartesian dualism.

Denies / rejects the premise 1

Hylomorphism

The substantial form is intrinsic to the body; consciousness without bodily continuity is, on Thomistic grounds, incoherent. The case projects a Cartesian dualism Aquinas would reject.

Reframes the question 3

Naturalism

Animalist naturalism (Olson): we are biological organisms; "prince" and "cobbler" track different organisms, and Locke confuses person with personality.

Buddhism

There is no persistent prince or cobbler to begin with; the case proves only that conventional identity follows the conventionally-recognised continuant, whichever that is.

Realism

Common-sense realism splits: ordinary identity-attributions track both body and biography; the case forces a choice the everyday concept does not require.