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Work #25 · Early

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Ludwig Wittgenstein
1918 (drafted in the trenches); 1921 (German pub.); 1922 (Ogden English ed.) · German (with parallel English text in the Ogden edition)
Numbered propositions (1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.12...) with seven theses · Analytic philosophy / logical atomism

The world is the totality of facts, not of things — and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Attribute Fingerprint

Rows where works disagree are highlighted in gold. The full ontology grid is shown.

Attribute Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Early)
Time · Extent Infinite
Time · Ontological Status Substantival
Time · Grain Continuous
Time · Freedom Deterministic
Time · Traversability Linear
Time · Dimensionality One
Time · Direction Uni-directional
Space · Extent Infinite
Space · Ontological Status Substantival
Space · Curvature Flat
Space · Dimensionality Three
Space · Locality Local
Matter · Extent Finite
Matter · Ontological Status Substantival
Matter · Conservation Conserved
Matter · Dimensionality Three
Matter · Locality Local
Observer · Time Instance Single
Observer · Space Instance Single
Observer · Knowledge Extent Immediate
Observer · Knowledge Retainment Total
Observer · Physicality Both
Observer · Agency Passive
Observer · Number Singular
Observer · Metaphysical Agency None
Observer · Moral Authority Reason
Observer · Theological Method
Energy · Extent Finite
Energy · Ontological Status Substantival
Energy · Conservation Conserved
Energy · Dispersibility Irreversible
Information · Ontological Status Substantival
Information · Cosmic Conservation Conserved
Information · Personal Conservation Non-conserved
Information · Granularity Discrete

Dimension-by-Dimension Evidence

What each work's passages reveal about its stance on each of the six dimensions.

Time

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Wittgenstein presupposes a roughly Newtonian-Russellian time in which facts obtain at moments; he does not theorise time as such. The Tractatus's ontology of states of affairs consists of timeless logical structures, instantiated in the temporal world. "Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space... so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things" (2.0121).

Space

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Space (with time and colour) is one of the "forms of objects" — a necessary form of every possible state of affairs (2.0251). It is substantival in the sense that it is part of the logical scaffolding of any possible world.

Matter

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The simple objects are not "material" in any everyday sense; they are whatever the ultimate constituents of states of affairs turn out to be. Wittgenstein never says what they are; this gap was one of the early Wittgenstein's concessions to the Vienna Circle and one of the loci of his later self-critique.

Observer

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The metaphysical subject "does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world" (5.632). Observer Number is Singular at this transcendental level — there is one subject, who is the limit of one's world — and the subject is more like a coordinate-frame than a person. Agency is passive in the strict philosophical sense: the world happens; what the subject *can* affect is its own will, which is a matter of "what is higher" and inexpressible (6.43, 6.421).

Energy

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Not engaged. Standard early-twentieth-century physical energetics is presupposed without discussion.

Information

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The picture theory makes information substantival: meaningful propositions picture facts by shared logical form. The information is conserved in the sense that the logical structure of reality is invariant. Personal information is not preserved across death — Wittgenstein is famously laconic on personal immortality, and Tractatus 6.4311 says only that "death is not an event in life."

Internal Tensions

Where each work's argument pulls against itself.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

The Tractatus's self-undermining is its single most contested feature. If 6.54 is right — its own propositions are nonsense — how can the reader have been led anywhere by them? Resolute readers (Diamond, Conant) take Wittgenstein at his word: the book is a therapeutic exercise. Standard readers (Russell, Hacker) think the book genuinely presents a metaphysics that Wittgenstein later rejected. The author-stage shift to the Investigations turns precisely on which reading is right.